A new identification approach distinguishing effort-affecting preference shocks from other GPA shocks yields peer effect estimates 40% higher than GPA-proxy methods when networks include isolated students, shown in US high school data.
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2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Optimal incentives in peer networks assign steeper contracts to central workers when output risk is high or to influencers of small low-influence teams under complementarity, plus a network statistic for equal-pay profit loss.
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Identifying Peer Effects in Networks with Unobserved Effort and Isolated Students
A new identification approach distinguishing effort-affecting preference shocks from other GPA shocks yields peer effect estimates 40% higher than GPA-proxy methods when networks include isolated students, shown in US high school data.
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Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace
Optimal incentives in peer networks assign steeper contracts to central workers when output risk is high or to influencers of small low-influence teams under complementarity, plus a network statistic for equal-pay profit loss.