{"as_of":"2026-08-09T22:40:00Z","caps":{"database_statements":6,"inbound":100,"outbound":100},"context_digest":"sha256:0bbbcbbe2ed9482f9623eab27a5eaa0d76185b6c941775cfbcdfcddcd7201598","coverage":[{"denominator":0,"lane":"reference_resolution","note":"Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.","records_observed":0,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":null,"state":"measured"},{"denominator":1,"lane":"standing_notices","note":"One-hop event checks from named stored sources.","records_observed":1,"source":"scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache","source_observed_at":"2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00","state":"measured"},{"denominator":1,"lane":"inbound_itemization","note":"Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.","records_observed":1,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":"2026-08-03T08:26:55.331258Z","state":"measured"},{"denominator":1,"lane":"external_citation_measurements","note":"A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.","records_observed":0,"source":"cited_works","source_observed_at":null,"state":"measured"}],"external_citation_measurements":[],"inbound":[{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2307.15805","last_updated":"2023-07-28T20:54:12Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-07-06T16:00:00.278754Z","submitted_at":"2023-07-28T20:54:12Z","title":"Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets","version":1},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":"2307.15805","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-03T08:26:55.331258Z","title":"Equilib- ria and incentives for illiquid auction markets.arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15805, to appear in Market Microstructure and Liquidity, 2023","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2601.17247","last_updated":"2026-07-30T17:43:34Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-09T15:46:07.607836Z","submitted_at":"2026-01-24T00:50:35Z","title":"Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions","version":2},"reference_index":20,"source":"pdf_text","source_observed_at":"2026-08-03T08:26:55.331258Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2307.15805","citing_paper":"/paper/2601.17247"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ce90247b1c287e3fdb5021873c48765e4969970afa81fa1fc96f3003eca00701","observation_id":"b99598f1-9062-4090-a154-204723b1ee04","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-03T08:26:55.331258Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}}],"links":{"evidence":"/evidence","html":"/paper/2307.15805/citation-record","integrity":"/paper/2307.15805/integrity","json":"/paper/2307.15805/citation-record.json","paper":"/paper/2307.15805"},"outbound":[],"paper":{"arxiv_id":"2307.15805","last_updated":"2023-07-28T20:54:12Z","latest_version":1,"primary_category":"q-fin.TR","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-07-06T16:00:00.278754Z","submitted_at":"2023-07-28T20:54:12Z","title":"Equilibria and incentives for illiquid auction markets"},"reference_resolution":{"displayed":0,"state_counts":{"malformed_identifier":0,"metadata_mismatch":0,"parse_uncertain":0,"unresolved":0,"verified_exact":0,"verified_fuzzy":0},"total_outbound_references":0},"refusal":"A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.","schema":"pith.paper-citation-record.v1","standing_sources":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-09T06:30:57.326959+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"thesis":"As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2307.15805."}