{"as_of":"2026-08-20T11:10:00Z","caps":{"database_statements":6,"inbound":100,"outbound":100},"context_digest":"sha256:16d8ede5b9c8e1926fb2548d0bf228b291379e6025e24eef0d60eeccdc3f713c","coverage":[{"denominator":51,"lane":"reference_resolution","note":"Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.","records_observed":51,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.367060Z","state":"measured"},{"denominator":51,"lane":"standing_notices","note":"One-hop event checks from named stored sources.","records_observed":51,"source":"scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache","source_observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","state":"measured"},{"denominator":0,"lane":"inbound_itemization","note":"Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.","records_observed":0,"source":"paper_references, paper_reference_links","source_observed_at":null,"state":"measured"},{"denominator":1,"lane":"external_citation_measurements","note":"A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.","records_observed":0,"source":"cited_works","source_observed_at":null,"state":"measured"}],"external_citation_measurements":[],"inbound":[],"links":{"evidence":"/evidence","html":"/paper/2506.09291/citation-record","integrity":"/paper/2506.09291/integrity","json":"/paper/2506.09291/citation-record.json","paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"outbound":[{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:23.035409Z","title":"Pricing with samples","venue":null,"work_id":"1ecb5930-2916-478f-a479-a60dfc4a84f8","year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":1,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:09.771222Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d90ff790505914bf49f07876a7a24f0930a64c44c4579f9c89e1455197c1d056","observation_id":"b28514f9-1461-469e-8d7b-b96907d21c5c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:23.116914Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.851419Z","title":"Optimal pricing with a single point","venue":null,"work_id":"cb971ffa-ac2a-4453-9f28-3687e75ca256","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":2,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:09.821696Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:197f936349b08d3a11fa4af7cb637e06096fc38bcc10a644c1b7af610ad0925f","observation_id":"2c0291da-1e93-4b15-89fa-59eac28fec1a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.936895Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.672955Z","title":"Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling","venue":null,"work_id":"d04292ec-1043-4525-966f-1462028e0c26","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":3,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:09.940786Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:eda33b8cc21868ee1df01e7604b3b609772e5f6690305fc935f8f18ff63cd54c","observation_id":"d48bdef4-1a42-4b27-a59e-791e27511198","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.756857Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.500146Z","title":"Optimal deterministic mechanisms for an additive buyer","venue":null,"work_id":"6c59b2be-2d2f-4888-9d93-708a2fba1629","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":4,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.002476Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:20022e4bba5684467e5e9d84c875dc9cc03e2902db4006f70fe21d516987cbd7","observation_id":"70b43694-faad-4c1e-bc62-090b1759902c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.592150Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.297638Z","title":"Matthew Weinberg","venue":null,"work_id":"0d5b7dc9-719c-4c18-a603-9f4e585afc89","year":2020},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":5,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.092186Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:db9d6ed4d78ad7e16d35e84180c242faac4317c3b1c00da4a74cb734abff26e9","observation_id":"d44c4b73-9ac5-42a7-adbe-554b5b363ede","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.430394Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.173605Z","title":"Properties of probability distributions with monotone hazard rate","venue":null,"work_id":"27db712c-6193-46e5-97d8-caecd987ae18","year":1963},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":6,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.155144Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d0b8db503e489f41110d1653253f4f61520848c64877f4b9d7eeb0339b3c53f9","observation_id":"f54e8594-338d-43e9-be3a-4dd31b515ab7","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.198488Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.005693Z","title":"Revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items","venue":null,"work_id":"a0b7ac33-3c89-4cc5-9987-5ed176150a78","year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":7,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.210202Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e459530e459cbb732c0b8dce4603f85549b0cd298cb81076d2575fc56e4125bb","observation_id":"c6f7d953-cee2-4062-be13-9112a5a7d311","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:22.092985Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.819562Z","title":"Haupt, and Alex Smolin","venue":null,"work_id":"bb12fed3-b9f6-4cad-9341-fea8437e2f60","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":8,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.304183Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e41014d9d297b80395b9968e88bde9b9bd6f941a34dee4d4eb19ab53a9ac39a8","observation_id":"fef90caf-23a5-44ec-919b-8837d2077b1a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.900862Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.595862Z","title":"Matthew Weinberg","venue":null,"work_id":"81bee70a-5b72-48a3-a956-3280cb4f4df8","year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":9,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.397931Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0b65766a9c2ca1b1f6d189b84c7781d06c0b3369ed5ffae88a8296dc9088ecb2","observation_id":"319afcbb-0993-451d-a5c9-1d4bf9df660c","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.698249Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.327454Z","title":"Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms","venue":null,"work_id":"2aade135-3bc6-460a-a4c4-35e7a5ad706a","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":10,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.473640Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:9b23c061383074a45491b73396b59a35edb09d0db07c01ed34b2c2d94b7aa6a0","observation_id":"71e2994b-3f1c-4662-9c89-477af0a1e111","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.476285Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.188229Z","title":"Auctions versus negotiations","venue":null,"work_id":"ae5ef913-db7d-4b23-a8d5-ba76d20f19a0","year":1996},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":11,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.544227Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0082819b527b3588cf788c74ec3196848c8a27483c886d5c94095ed88ef3d166","observation_id":"061a08e0-88b6-4542-8e11-168723b53baf","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.237537Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.940769Z","title":"The simple economics of optimal auctions","venue":null,"work_id":"dfb3a72f-3647-46e9-9c38-18a5b1b0da63","year":1989},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":12,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.595937Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f10d0a2f290de256b548d26028fb0ef4abff03095f07409840250ac554b6b10e","observation_id":"0f0c3682-965f-4127-be3f-557555af3fc0","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:21.059273Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.690662Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":"a4d05de3-a30d-4db9-ab5a-9105b42dab4c","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":13,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.650520Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:b450349b3ab77c4aabd8f89acd8bd451d87058f70e0c02a286aa54c297fda9b9","observation_id":"3035224c-6132-443c-85d9-761a49202ed9","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.820986Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.541339Z","title":"Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality","venue":null,"work_id":"3262a89b-374e-4da8-8ad9-4058e0db824a","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":14,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.698425Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:9bc72914aabf875353ebea200e5b5e6c7eca2e386bab77905fce407e4c59779d","observation_id":"3eacfd9f-3a51-4fc7-ae66-0d6c5a12153e","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.619497Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.388853Z","title":"Devanur, and S","venue":null,"work_id":"dc08478a-753b-40df-bacc-a4088facfecf","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":15,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.750617Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f9c702ec2ee5fcd5eee71a52ebfee00aaeb086813122fcb4c6ae5e7ba3b2041b","observation_id":"cc01520a-7a18-453d-8e41-002abb274095","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.460634Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.193938Z","title":"Benjamin Miller","venue":null,"work_id":"af80084d-24a2-4328-9d40-f51cc18f70b6","year":2016},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":16,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.789162Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:cdd198859c702481327d65a82cb67ed0123ac2e8c5c1e02e33e1d15a26c6d6a7","observation_id":"48240c1d-7ac8-4403-ab2f-a57fc06be6cc","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.295124Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.980581Z","title":"Hartline, and Robert D","venue":null,"work_id":"2f8d39ff-bae8-4fc4-a157-a9a7c30e804c","year":2007},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":17,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.838848Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:5a8ecb8aa35e374a3bf7dc95d776145f1b0d9d94ac04e359c41b36f1cf7d6b39","observation_id":"dde8222c-dcea-4c53-9061-02f1d1723b52","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:20.070898Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.790598Z","title":"Hartline, David L","venue":null,"work_id":"04f5f907-7419-429e-b25d-8a8116a11f08","year":2010},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":18,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.896697Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:afeb05ef34512d85382598ca61a5cb3d56c1ac8c403b3c5360c50eddcc6b7aa4","observation_id":"195d81c6-07bf-4494-8acb-810cfd4f77ac","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.880256Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.637762Z","title":"The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design","venue":null,"work_id":"c972243f-6891-42ea-9a3f-bb01cb261c87","year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":19,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.942135Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ff5ce1f2853c323bcf214b4fa6e5b19bc6592eb10820805e10b87b0262774bbf","observation_id":"a6c9c806-a5db-4d9d-9cf5-b7eff81e3632","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.681421Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.461106Z","title":"Applications of \\( \\) -strongly regular distributions to bayesian auctions","venue":null,"work_id":"82f8f6ae-930e-4d90-bfe7-8afcd55f9c0e","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":20,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:10.994294Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:db42966f6c0fcd6f686f648390ca52e84bb18976cc93971041589c1af120eb42","observation_id":"4a2d034e-2285-4899-aa4d-a3d8db7d5cfb","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.519672Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.315889Z","title":"The sample complexity of revenue maximization","venue":null,"work_id":"b07aeaa1-39c3-426e-836c-5cc18fcd0d96","year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":21,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.045338Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:c3ed9a0fcdcbc0b460fcb6a9fb6299d4758ab054f5b49ec3bfb98b49fe37d47b","observation_id":"73b9e2ab-ee7b-4652-97ae-8d1d7a02580a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.362374Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":null,"pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.100394Z","title":"An introduction to statistical modeling of extreme values, volume 208","venue":null,"work_id":null,"year":2001},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":22,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.100394Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:1aa8d4ef49e443c8e9dd1c17389599fad077f65b109389669d9bf75bd9e35ce5","observation_id":"b8cb5fad-cfc5-4565-b76f-4a2f86f2d951","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.100394Z","resolver_source":null,"status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"reason":"canonical_work_link_unavailable","source_receipts":[],"state":"unavailable"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.175747Z","title":"Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist","venue":null,"work_id":"0e1873bb-a64a-481f-9999-5b72b190d865","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":23,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.155722Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ea45dabd57a133785857a756931e2c543d9b73a9162791a01491af304dd9e2fb","observation_id":"d7815aa1-8aa6-474a-a8a3-3015da70503a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.230416Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.974988Z","title":"Matthew Weinberg, and Eric Xue","venue":null,"work_id":"feeccc2b-d2c2-4c2d-833f-b6ae6967b11c","year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":24,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.205569Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3edd3f63e877f60584262d6b7b736e1fde4c12150397d81ab7738b12c424413b","observation_id":"f3489799-ea32-477e-9d7c-71c61624652a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:19.072127Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.821993Z","title":"The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer: The general case","venue":null,"work_id":"b415b1c9-fc0e-4c19-bc77-448fe318b4ad","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":25,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.259505Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d9e3a49a0d025c9eb699bf8502d9d8c230d9f71971a4ccfa414baa19e0361bfe","observation_id":"a95ff3bd-eb1f-4c63-97e5-c2e19695c829","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.892082Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.652103Z","title":"Revenue maximization with a single sample","venue":null,"work_id":"82665f73-37ca-42ae-afd4-4bda830acd2c","year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":26,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.333055Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:b579fbaed6e4da499c80d2a9f1bda02cbe379a03855f8073eb9e59412c323730","observation_id":"34e1bce6-41df-4dab-8dcc-7e4226851169","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.732980Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.481013Z","title":"The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders","venue":null,"work_id":"3d2305ea-ea64-4ca5-91b4-f375118454e9","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":27,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.384975Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:410c2709ff28f42bf8e497300404d876a642d33a662d0ca3e2929ae67694d217","observation_id":"03e7641f-83b9-4b38-bb53-db2e8e86a5f6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.560886Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.304869Z","title":null,"venue":null,"work_id":"cd3a584c-1ef9-4b7d-bccf-c4d47190fa68","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":28,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.423654Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:438525464c741e45a24e045cfa61c6dedaf12e0d6824aa329d1c4564ff96a822","observation_id":"03867a07-ba73-410f-9242-e113b7c293a4","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.405431Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"unresolved"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2411.03583","last_updated":"2024-11-06T00:48:20Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-20T05:05:32.258711Z","submitted_at":"2024-11-06T00:48:20Z","title":"Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited","version":1},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":"2411.03583","doi":null,"metadata_source":"pith","pith_arxiv_id":"2411.03583","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.668252Z","title":"Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited","venue":"cs.GT","work_id":"7bdb6f9f-247b-4824-a74e-11528b125a46","year":2024},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":29,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.493815Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2411.03583","citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:bfbf658891810ea5af6b256af833ebf6f1380c38eb165affad05fcacd543acaa","observation_id":"ef004a7c-e4bd-42f0-bb21-6ad0da7b1029","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.775315Z","resolver_source":"local_arxiv","status":"verified_exact"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.127166Z","title":"The vickrey auction with a single duplicate bidder approximates the optimal revenue","venue":null,"work_id":"2a87c4a7-1e80-42b9-aef4-748eee9fe081","year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":30,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.550815Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e1619a2aa7d7d52f42648a994077ecc47fdf28923603b6a6e36295521c5ad068","observation_id":"a1f7f4fe-33d0-42f0-911c-efd1a73fc9e6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.214051Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.979014Z","title":"A characterization for optimal bundling of products with nonadditive values","venue":null,"work_id":"fba64763-7f46-482b-9996-a51aa2f77498","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":31,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.619472Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:6038ba10f3a0ad4176a8f1a06dfc583c267e4988ccde21f0a5cf11508afeb4f1","observation_id":"a622dfdd-8201-4125-a715-fa78a55d4115","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:18.048299Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.824998Z","title":"Selling two goods optimally","venue":null,"work_id":"22cf85ed-0d93-4bca-85ce-221df76f19b4","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":32,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.669420Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7d40efb8730cf261831a1fed86273cddfbcd5a40576879320ad57995f1c6e95d","observation_id":"54ddfb05-87a8-4c54-85c2-947a6dfb0d35","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.907983Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.677225Z","title":"Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions","venue":null,"work_id":"4aaa9137-7486-4d94-91a6-8296aa03538d","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":33,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.744887Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e9a8db7984cbcda4526f36800935deef0c83685771760fe6d3d0b1197dd82794","observation_id":"674c602d-6eb4-46bf-b51b-5941ef6d8d83","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.762316Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.553612Z","title":"Optimal pricing for mhr and -regular distributions","venue":null,"work_id":"390b226a-7ed9-40ba-81c9-44531f136892","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":34,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.832012Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7de7414bf4c9e115e0f0357087cac7f7b442d239be9d3de9868496f8542c7a93","observation_id":"93f2b9f6-08b2-40ee-89be-12772766ec42","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.612999Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.412562Z","title":"Robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information","venue":null,"work_id":"8d4187e2-fb82-401f-8126-af142147a4de","year":2023},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":35,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.898148Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ec1dbc8a14640ed97e48d20abcdde4ebe4d43c83a315e97c23dd0d3c760d4b58","observation_id":"4c41f2ed-4614-412f-b241-ef2ee1246558","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.484329Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.187176Z","title":"When is pure bundling optimal? The Review of Economic Studies, 88 0 (3): 0 1127--1156, 2021","venue":null,"work_id":"6f7d99c0-5e0f-4659-9e7c-2787be815863","year":2021},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":36,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:11.984021Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:96d4898695464a62dd90b4751ee22da9c24328286aaf35a22260225c65593118","observation_id":"8d1fbc79-9c55-489d-a138-a7df8a18d015","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.326207Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.915942Z","title":"Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items","venue":null,"work_id":"9f290308-0698-4eb2-afc3-f047b127bb61","year":2017},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":37,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.068997Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:bb2838febfbd7613fab3b00bf278c5ab213ae71b5e41e2425ddd43a72f229fa1","observation_id":"8e429e46-91fd-44d2-baf0-9cf3dee7b1fb","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:17.076329Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.735499Z","title":"Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations","venue":null,"work_id":"3a2b6154-3934-4ccb-b453-1c7056c8cb08","year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":38,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.135301Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:f1aea59df1631490e00ce3f72ec914c010dd75472d040624931804051d3c75ad","observation_id":"ea4990e2-6534-4c6a-9e7c-c9474710712f","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.842186Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.532508Z","title":"Hartline and Tim Roughgarden","venue":null,"work_id":"7921789d-a19c-4240-9da3-c9e01bbfd598","year":2009},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":39,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.220917Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:461a6d5f99866b11ccde5bcbd93ef9259615aaf46e532443f356bd887f28bfcd","observation_id":"1825e406-b025-44af-9d99-6a7298d833fb","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.637016Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.195573Z","title":"On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items","venue":null,"work_id":"df49c4be-5db6-4635-9f89-97a337346a44","year":2013},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":40,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.306985Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:e428771cb8de177745254edf3f5f2087452791e49adc0daeda50869504a92d00","observation_id":"c539c304-a039-40ab-bd38-40e1c2331565","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.354957Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.980442Z","title":"On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design","venue":null,"work_id":"ed9f9347-422d-43d2-920e-47a54c17e482","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":41,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.375289Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:34baa39435546b8f88b991fb54621b89b722a9455bb4608d318b62ee0dbd3b12","observation_id":"5ef364c4-672e-44ee-a102-cf86e882a4a6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:16.082336Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.747538Z","title":"Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist","venue":null,"work_id":"451178a4-7602-48b8-8f21-1baf7814593b","year":2006},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":42,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.449081Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d638cb8527ac5adbd1a7710983faee1a2ebb7fffb56e59c14f9f3480b94d0216","observation_id":"169d8c10-9eb6-46b5-af44-142a6cff08a6","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.846600Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.504332Z","title":"Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design","venue":null,"work_id":"b8cf779d-7d4d-4d21-b276-551c1de93af8","year":1988},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":43,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.595173Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:4828e542f8395ad94bfc971b5b222711ce199c5c3cea46e19f884631dc8de653","observation_id":"31d53f41-d004-414e-a168-c48aee703147","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.625766Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.286909Z","title":"Bidding rings","venue":null,"work_id":"e2da5c98-3bc5-40b8-90d4-95ef19e39e4c","year":1992},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":44,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.722431Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3ecda7dc36ce97e4d96f56770c4a325f9ff06e811bc31f50adc23ca7cfbff084","observation_id":"95aa6d5a-7f7b-47b9-adcb-7efac7f5bc4d","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.381474Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.983648Z","title":"Optimal auction design","venue":null,"work_id":"68d2ab57-ed31-450a-9702-5dd6e4f9dd43","year":1981},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":45,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.782821Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:a04f293e85b4162a30c80e8da7210652552522344970578dcec4cc64c672805b","observation_id":"8d95b316-860d-48e5-b28d-50fc2bf83ec9","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:15.166039Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.745697Z","title":"Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity","venue":null,"work_id":"8860b0e7-813e-4098-a155-47c7a2eae808","year":2018},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":46,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.911114Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7518f70b611c9197843f992ab0e4651605e308148c30bfebf5ed7baf3c97976a","observation_id":"7b6e39e4-4d8e-46ca-ac17-3b7f1fd5510a","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.801792Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.493814Z","title":"Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition","venue":null,"work_id":"513d4476-750e-4f66-9cd2-827557f9b6e0","year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":47,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:12.989849Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:0e65959bac2228df6b0226e818e02f91cb7fba2e09d74b017dfc14095cbb46ee","observation_id":"eb5820fa-526a-4b51-afa7-27328c89ba32","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.596789Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.291888Z","title":"Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations","venue":null,"work_id":"049e87d6-ac56-4b1e-9afe-7795783fc646","year":2019},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":48,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.086516Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:7ce9a91ad12e1e9190f9ede1a9eda8059bf9bc1a3cc691ffe01abd39b9e682c6","observation_id":"332f18a4-ce92-4c66-81d9-d12e3e1c9712","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.383314Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.092003Z","title":"Optimal mechanisms with simple menus","venue":null,"work_id":"970cf0ec-c448-405e-bfca-19e20fed1bc9","year":2014},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":49,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.168247Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:ca59cc687c210e0f3831939605cfad38bc2e9e771be27481d49457705f7da75e","observation_id":"ed3e0bd4-16c1-42e2-a82d-71c8633ff7c3","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:14.188865Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2212.12623","last_updated":"2023-04-08T03:55:09Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-17T16:35:15.568933Z","submitted_at":"2022-12-24T01:00:15Z","title":"The Simple Economics of Optimal Bundling","version":2},"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":"2212.12623","doi":null,"metadata_source":"pith","pith_arxiv_id":"2212.12623","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.508684Z","title":"The Simple Economics of Optimal Bundling","venue":"econ.TH","work_id":"b72b977d-e10d-4ece-96c5-e71f9a6a92af","year":2022},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":50,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.268905Z"},"links":{"cited_paper":"/paper/2212.12623","citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:d6e052398a319cff7eebbc2874bf65558e0b3b7701b107ed6ec2fdb384c4275c","observation_id":"db0e0aaa-bc5a-483a-987e-1a77e5cd03fe","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.575647Z","resolver_source":"local_arxiv","status":"verified_exact"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}},{"citation":{"cited_paper":null,"cited_work":{"arxiv_id":null,"doi":null,"metadata_source":"raw_reference","pith_arxiv_id":null,"snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.893917Z","title":"An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications","venue":null,"work_id":"65a4395f-d03c-4277-9543-d8fa646d67f2","year":2015},"citing_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity","version":1},"reference_index":51,"source":"arxiv_source","source_observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.367060Z"},"links":{"citing_paper":"/paper/2506.09291"},"observation_digest":"sha256:3b712e39795b03a698246f7d67e3c8e75782b47d21ec6adcbf1eeccbed6e243a","observation_id":"bc2fbd74-529c-4489-9a05-c9142aeddfa5","resolution":{"observed_at":"2026-08-07T05:08:13.981651Z","resolver_source":"raw_fallback","status":"verified_fuzzy"},"standing_notice":{"events":[],"observation":"No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00.","reason":null,"source_receipts":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"state":"measured"}}],"paper":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09291","last_updated":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","latest_version":1,"primary_category":"cs.GT","snapshot_observed_at":"2026-08-12T21:53:47.314584Z","submitted_at":"2025-06-10T22:58:01Z","title":"Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity"},"reference_resolution":{"displayed":51,"state_counts":{"malformed_identifier":0,"metadata_mismatch":0,"parse_uncertain":0,"unresolved":3,"verified_exact":2,"verified_fuzzy":46},"total_outbound_references":51},"refusal":"A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.","schema":"pith.paper-citation-record.v1","standing_sources":[{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:59.587034+00:00","source":"crossref"},{"observed_at":"2026-08-20T06:33:54.927442+00:00","source":"retraction_watch"}],"thesis":"As of 20 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 51 of 51 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2506.09291."}