{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2018:2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII","short_pith_number":"pith:2SXTKASP","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"d4af35024fb510f29070cf0049716d4221f04d0a8296ba8fc6afc2b4fd9fde81","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1810.13256","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Secure Communication over Interference Channel: To Jam or Not to Jam?","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.IT"],"primary_cat":"cs.IT","authors_text":"Jinyuan Chen","submitted_at":"2018-10-30T05:13:06Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider a secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime where the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without cooperative jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale) is no"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1810.13256","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.IT","submitted_at":"2018-10-30T05:13:06Z","cross_cats_sorted":["math.IT"],"title_canon_sha256":"0c74fd66789bbdbddc051e0508ebc3bd92e584fdeb5497fdb5e306904a396b8d","abstract_canon_sha256":"41da9e7ff7041e9f43aaf136852dbcc689472e1b09653c131c671f8b804dc1e4"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.868227Z","signature_b64":"PZV/AHlrw3EZOqvB2lwi1+d9LHGN7nZoLTeYTeVLqqc9UUT5dCuUnB6y6lyyxfukIh7N0FZRMI2ZsgiZ7SbUCw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"d4af35024fb510f29070cf0049716d4221f04d0a8296ba8fc6afc2b4fd9fde81","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867687Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867687Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Secure Communication over Interference Channel: To Jam or Not to Jam?","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.IT"],"primary_cat":"cs.IT","authors_text":"Jinyuan Chen","submitted_at":"2018-10-30T05:13:06Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider a secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime where the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without cooperative jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. For the symmetric case, this simple scheme is optimal when the interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale) is no"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1810.13256","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1810.13256","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867775+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1810.13256v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867775+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1810.13256","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867775+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"2SXTKASPWUIP","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:02.567920+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:02.567920+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"2SXTKASP","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:02.567920+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"1907.04599","citing_title":"Adding Common Randomness Can Remove the Secrecy Constraints in Communication Networks","ref_index":12,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII","json":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/2SXTKASP"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/2SXTKASP","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1810.13256&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/2SXTKASPWUIPFEDQZ4AES4LNII/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867775+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:49.867775+00:00"}