{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2026:2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M","short_pith_number":"pith:2WALO7PB","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"d580b77de1b3dc45522b69d99fcdcbd31b52541983279cf7844a513cf2c1a8b5","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2605.12559","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Coordination Failures and Stackelberg Leadership in Housing Development with Network Effects","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"A large first-moving developer always commits to at least the high-supply equilibrium, eliminating coordination failures in housing markets with network effects.","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Vaibhav Rangan","submitted_at":"2026-05-11T21:03:38Z","abstract_excerpt":"I study coordination failures in housing development markets with network effects, where the value of building depends on aggregate supply. When network effects are sufficiently strong and convex, multiple equilibria arise: a low-supply coordination failure and a high-supply outcome. Without a coordination mechanism, equilibrium is indeterminate. I introduce a large developer who moves first in a Stackelberg game, committing to housing supply before atomistic developers make entry decisions. The main result is that the large developer always commits at least to the high-supply equilibrium, eli"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":true,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2605.12559","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2026-05-11T21:03:38Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"6b7eb812ac6c7ae8e3ffe86e70a071482bf8e06514c28b907f1ff836daade2c5","abstract_canon_sha256":"c99c0fc8816f3b0387891f4af58942f0ad7873a8299570d72f6b81066d6adb14"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.003367Z","signature_b64":"lEKiZElNdOMurdu4olUWWMi7oNOT+Eo90JUiy6oD4NYdoVliFxuuB8EjYRcT5rnwB19+cgL1CYtyPTzgGcDTCg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"d580b77de1b3dc45522b69d99fcdcbd31b52541983279cf7844a513cf2c1a8b5","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002847Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002847Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Coordination Failures and Stackelberg Leadership in Housing Development with Network Effects","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"A large first-moving developer always commits to at least the high-supply equilibrium, eliminating coordination failures in housing markets with network effects.","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Vaibhav Rangan","submitted_at":"2026-05-11T21:03:38Z","abstract_excerpt":"I study coordination failures in housing development markets with network effects, where the value of building depends on aggregate supply. When network effects are sufficiently strong and convex, multiple equilibria arise: a low-supply coordination failure and a high-supply outcome. Without a coordination mechanism, equilibrium is indeterminate. I introduce a large developer who moves first in a Stackelberg game, committing to housing supply before atomistic developers make entry decisions. The main result is that the large developer always commits at least to the high-supply equilibrium, eli"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"The large developer always commits at least to the high-supply equilibrium, eliminating the coordination failure by pushing past the unstable threshold that separates the low and high outcomes. The result is unconditional; it holds for general demand functions and cost distributions, and does not depend on which stable continuation equilibrium materializes.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The model assumes that network effects are sufficiently strong and convex to generate multiple equilibria with an unstable threshold, and that the large developer can credibly commit to its supply level before atomistic developers make their entry decisions in the continuation game.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"A Stackelberg leader developer always commits to at least the high-supply equilibrium in housing markets with network effects, eliminating coordination failures for general demand and cost functions.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"A large first-moving developer always commits to at least the high-supply equilibrium, eliminating coordination failures in housing markets with network effects.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"68f4be1978a088e233572eb908ea966a1f898fa14dd7b1ad754a2cc55651229f"},"source":{"id":"2605.12559","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":"ba91acd0-0ad2-41a4-bc59-527c8f47b4bb","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-14T21:38:21.223366Z","strongest_claim":"The large developer always commits at least to the high-supply equilibrium, eliminating the coordination failure by pushing past the unstable threshold that separates the low and high outcomes. The result is unconditional; it holds for general demand functions and cost distributions, and does not depend on which stable continuation equilibrium materializes.","one_line_summary":"A Stackelberg leader developer always commits to at least the high-supply equilibrium in housing markets with network effects, eliminating coordination failures for general demand and cost functions.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The model assumes that network effects are sufficiently strong and convex to generate multiple equilibria with an unstable threshold, and that the large developer can credibly commit to its supply level before atomistic developers make their entry decisions in the continuation game.","pith_extraction_headline":"A large first-moving developer always commits to at least the high-supply equilibrium, eliminating coordination failures in housing markets with network effects."},"references":{"count":23,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"Journal of the European Economic Association , volume =","work_id":"89a03b6a-f9da-44ed-8a6c-19ee933ec385","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"The RAND Journal of Economics , volume =","work_id":"9863d3e0-cf90-45ba-8497-917ee1ef4c2b","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"The RAND Journal of Economics , volume =","work_id":"619c68e5-30a4-4547-8e32-c331d384ff5b","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"Glen , title =","work_id":"413a6720-8040-4fa6-8d0a-c6feff8aa9ec","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"","year":null,"title":"Michael , title =","work_id":"1c3501c4-8cea-440f-b632-2980d4982cb6","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":23,"snapshot_sha256":"a5cf9afebb255919d4abd05baafdba72ee980e3f26fa0a5808e9e1ef7fe10a44","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2605.12559","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002931+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2605.12559v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002931+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2605.12559","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002931+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"2WALO7PBWPOE","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37.589309+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"2WALO7PBWPOEKURL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37.589309+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"2WALO7PB","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37.589309+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M","json":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/2WALO7PB"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/2WALO7PB","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2605.12559&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/2WALO7PBWPOEKURLNHMZ7TOL2M/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002931+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T03:10:02.002931+00:00"}