{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2025:34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS","short_pith_number":"pith:34PLDROW","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"df1eb1c5d6de23232ef5d911316d9064a183a3c2e352fe7448f16d52936b63f5","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2509.02947","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Zero-Error Nash Equilibrium: Harnessing Nonlocal Correlation in Incomplete Information Games","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"Ambuj, Amit Mukherjee, Anandamay Das Bhowmik, Kuntal Som, Ram Krishna Patra, Siddharth R. Pandey, Tushar","submitted_at":"2025-09-03T02:26:25Z","abstract_excerpt":"Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information coordinate on a Nash equilibrium with zero probability of error? We identify Bayesian games in which such coordination is impossible classically, yet achievable by harnessing Bell nonlocal correlations. We formalize this requirement as zero-error Nash equilibrium coordination, establishing a new bridge between information theory, game theory, and quantum nonloca"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2509.02947","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2025-09-03T02:26:25Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"title_canon_sha256":"23f0cc0e7d3d4bceb3c3a95be2606fd5672a6bd185b5ca8aa4f7cad18357369f","abstract_canon_sha256":"3eb8c1d0423a353e118e8a103b62db7d6b57e8ec15297de7eb786cab33f41874"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.457206Z","signature_b64":"JQqgYXoL0M6qAoHs2Fm5jWHFVjFpNIVPQOjtcE9RSJoEnKxVvgE+4gADaWwYf986CKHcYDPs+8fpRa3uFGugCQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"df1eb1c5d6de23232ef5d911316d9064a183a3c2e352fe7448f16d52936b63f5","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456463Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456463Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Zero-Error Nash Equilibrium: Harnessing Nonlocal Correlation in Incomplete Information Games","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"Ambuj, Amit Mukherjee, Anandamay Das Bhowmik, Kuntal Som, Ram Krishna Patra, Siddharth R. Pandey, Tushar","submitted_at":"2025-09-03T02:26:25Z","abstract_excerpt":"Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information coordinate on a Nash equilibrium with zero probability of error? We identify Bayesian games in which such coordination is impossible classically, yet achievable by harnessing Bell nonlocal correlations. We formalize this requirement as zero-error Nash equilibrium coordination, establishing a new bridge between information theory, game theory, and quantum nonloca"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2509.02947","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2509.02947/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2509.02947","created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2509.02947v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2509.02947","created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"34PLDROW3YRS","created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"34PLDROW3YRSGLXV","created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"34PLDROW","created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2509.02947","citing_title":"Zero-Error Nash Equilibrium: Harnessing Nonlocal Correlation in Incomplete Information Games","ref_index":1,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS","json":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/34PLDROW"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/34PLDROW","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2509.02947&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/34PLDROW3YRSGLXV3EITC3MQMS/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T12:04:00.456579+00:00"}