{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2024:35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK","short_pith_number":"pith:35FK7NBB","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2411.08026","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2024-11-12T18:56:31Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"title_canon_sha256":"80af5e9cfd3e452a806348323079e34357f948aabf5dacbf609da8d1838c408a","abstract_canon_sha256":"086e72c87f5369e4fdae08a2c531c47345d7b30a8989ff200475f2cbee688795"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"df4aafb4219ddc19694d2dcc1e244d8a8711fdaff8269535e81e4fbb1d637e61","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2411.08026","version":3},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2411.08026","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2411.08026v3","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2411.08026","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"35FK7NBBTXOB","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"35FK7NBBTXOBS2KN","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"35FK7NBB","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2024:35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2411.08026","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2024-11-12T18:56:31Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"title_canon_sha256":"80af5e9cfd3e452a806348323079e34357f948aabf5dacbf609da8d1838c408a","abstract_canon_sha256":"086e72c87f5369e4fdae08a2c531c47345d7b30a8989ff200475f2cbee688795"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"df4aafb4219ddc19694d2dcc1e244d8a8711fdaff8269535e81e4fbb1d637e61","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39.703127Z","signature_b64":"T0QlJt37jAM/qcvEAhOvrfaKFKo++yTjYFAcXGyA1An1X92iU+bLUvzOWyO9aOLZ3oXJ1P/r2dK1EF2v3xuhCA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"df4aafb4219ddc19694d2dcc1e244d8a8711fdaff8269535e81e4fbb1d637e61","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39.702226Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39.702226Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"2411.08026","source_version":3,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"N+cL2XDYBbjodSFgy1ppLQ0RF3VmBx+/l+BegfYVmEB/UaqEH2AKmP3HYQwUlcy0zW8ROh0Ed04rirQ8l1KjBg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-08-14T10:47:32.008436Z"},"content_sha256":"77e8afee1811bc0f31ac36f3beb9fa9a7b4ad1ad78015e3de21bf7034009462f","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:77e8afee1811bc0f31ac36f3beb9fa9a7b4ad1ad78015e3de21bf7034009462f"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2024:35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Incentive Design with Spillovers","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Anant Shah, Benjamin Golub, Krishna Dasaratha","submitted_at":"2024-11-12T18:56:31Z","abstract_excerpt":"A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and outcomes. Incentive optimality requires equalizing, across agents, a product of (i) individual productivity (ii) organizational centrality and (iii) responsiveness to monetary incentives. We specialize the model to explore several applied questi"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2411.08026","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2411.08026/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"gyhq1625GNh7il0iQ/WIA8urc/d7N1wp/vEl/vbIetK4qC6rbe5RBV0yRwQQNMAbGVgY35WXLP3vV5hPzScSCg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-08-14T10:47:32.009063Z"},"content_sha256":"88b07cc00a2717e17c2b1646d7cc63dd156e9ed7c328819f6f146532eaba6d19","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:88b07cc00a2717e17c2b1646d7cc63dd156e9ed7c328819f6f146532eaba6d19"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-08-14T10:47:32Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2024:35FK7NBBTXOBS2KNFXGB4JCNRK","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"086e72c87f5369e4fdae08a2c531c47345d7b30a8989ff200475f2cbee688795","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2024-11-12T18:56:31Z","title_canon_sha256":"80af5e9cfd3e452a806348323079e34357f948aabf5dacbf609da8d1838c408a"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2411.08026","kind":"arxiv","version":3}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2411.08026","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2411.08026v3","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2411.08026","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"35FK7NBBTXOB","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"35FK7NBBTXOBS2KN","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"35FK7NBB","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:88b07cc00a2717e17c2b1646d7cc63dd156e9ed7c328819f6f146532eaba6d19","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"integrity":{"available":true,"clean":true,"detectors_run":[],"endpoint":"/pith/2411.08026/integrity.json","findings":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938","summary":{"advisory":0,"by_detector":{},"critical":0,"informational":0}},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and outcomes. Incentive optimality requires equalizing, across agents, a product of (i) individual productivity (ii) organizational centrality and (iii) responsiveness to monetary incentives. We specialize the model to explore several applied questi","authors_text":"Anant Shah, Benjamin Golub, Krishna Dasaratha","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"headline":"","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2024-11-12T18:56:31Z","title":"Incentive Design with Spillovers"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2411.08026","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:77e8afee1811bc0f31ac36f3beb9fa9a7b4ad1ad78015e3de21bf7034009462f","target":"record","created_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"086e72c87f5369e4fdae08a2c531c47345d7b30a8989ff200475f2cbee688795","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2024-11-12T18:56:31Z","title_canon_sha256":"80af5e9cfd3e452a806348323079e34357f948aabf5dacbf609da8d1838c408a"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2411.08026","kind":"arxiv","version":3}},"canonical_sha256":"df4aafb4219ddc19694d2dcc1e244d8a8711fdaff8269535e81e4fbb1d637e61","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"df4aafb4219ddc19694d2dcc1e244d8a8711fdaff8269535e81e4fbb1d637e61","first_computed_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39.702226Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39.702226Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"T0QlJt37jAM/qcvEAhOvrfaKFKo++yTjYFAcXGyA1An1X92iU+bLUvzOWyO9aOLZ3oXJ1P/r2dK1EF2v3xuhCA==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-07-16T00:21:39.703127Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"2411.08026","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":3}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:77e8afee1811bc0f31ac36f3beb9fa9a7b4ad1ad78015e3de21bf7034009462f","sha256:88b07cc00a2717e17c2b1646d7cc63dd156e9ed7c328819f6f146532eaba6d19"],"state_sha256":"2a65f93600cf2cc0bbb3eee482d22e2e4b1d2509ce489b439e8f6a1499384cfe"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"qsrKE3Uag87j8efehkjp5KebYFkW8uaKTk41wfl4pOy21IKXdV0v95cLA7HtN9h7iz7qGYnqhAOIEuh19aYYAQ==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-08-14T10:47:32.012885Z","bundle_sha256":"4582923af70f2a982d4ea8e0b280697cb51b095744fd0a9b28b1413f9d07c041"}}