{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU","short_pith_number":"pith:3I2K2KBR","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"da34ad28311360f839fc7fccdb77b8ad074f0c374db05af61c0aac4686f84917","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1505.04989","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Evolutionary Dynamics for Persistent Cooperation in Structured Populations","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["physics.soc-ph"],"primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","authors_text":"Jens Christian Claussen, Wanlin Guo, Xinsheng Liu, Yan Li","submitted_at":"2015-05-19T13:29:34Z","abstract_excerpt":"The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This feature still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a multiplying factor. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperative strategies, including a recent model in which only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players through introduci"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1505.04989","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","submitted_at":"2015-05-19T13:29:34Z","cross_cats_sorted":["physics.soc-ph"],"title_canon_sha256":"7feab23809da4e2bf5646346c2b52355245556bde82fb8d334636038b3295435","abstract_canon_sha256":"13fb7e765d2190a329feff08c58e447583b0dc7efd6c88e46e56cf70163a31a1"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.152298Z","signature_b64":"Od9wEI/uKrWD8HYBljrzWGkrocjdn9TL3G+zko1dzj27R0xX0jn92Qx8NW2oBu7dcZr95dH7wAjAeTI+XsZuDg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"da34ad28311360f839fc7fccdb77b8ad074f0c374db05af61c0aac4686f84917","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151582Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151582Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Evolutionary Dynamics for Persistent Cooperation in Structured Populations","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["physics.soc-ph"],"primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","authors_text":"Jens Christian Claussen, Wanlin Guo, Xinsheng Liu, Yan Li","submitted_at":"2015-05-19T13:29:34Z","abstract_excerpt":"The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This feature still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a multiplying factor. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperative strategies, including a recent model in which only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players through introduci"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1505.04989","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1505.04989","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151712+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1505.04989v1","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151712+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1505.04989","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151712+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"3I2K2KBRCNQP","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:02.477457+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:02.477457+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"3I2K2KBR","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:02.477457+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU","json":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/3I2K2KBR"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/3I2K2KBR","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1505.04989&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/3I2K2KBRCNQPQOP4P7GNW55YVU/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151712+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-17T23:40:50.151712+00:00"}