{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2021:3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF","short_pith_number":"pith:3YFBAJ7L","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2103.03911","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2021-03-05T19:38:07Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"6975a18b265a4929aabf7d7179e471ff1ad62a8c100dbda3311ed73c6d732fe6","abstract_canon_sha256":"4176335cb17092b6b520b54d50d7b7676258384780f35714ba01b37efca0e8f5"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"de0a1027ebcec292534eb3126d10728168d9ede67d59c6cc9fe6985bf5cbbc4f","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2103.03911","version":1},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2103.03911","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2103.03911v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2103.03911","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"3YFBAJ7LZ3BJ","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2O","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"3YFBAJ7L","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2021:3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2103.03911","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2021-03-05T19:38:07Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"6975a18b265a4929aabf7d7179e471ff1ad62a8c100dbda3311ed73c6d732fe6","abstract_canon_sha256":"4176335cb17092b6b520b54d50d7b7676258384780f35714ba01b37efca0e8f5"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"de0a1027ebcec292534eb3126d10728168d9ede67d59c6cc9fe6985bf5cbbc4f","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43.841632Z","signature_b64":"wTFZ9TZ87fC1yFFuLKYu9+3UMNP2VrfOcrOcfXtGHTksS13hRSRcL7wgF5n8fmdEnUfZIwXE1MidqRgrMUONBQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"de0a1027ebcec292534eb3126d10728168d9ede67d59c6cc9fe6985bf5cbbc4f","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43.841215Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43.841215Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"2103.03911","source_version":1,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"qxa8B467l0fhW52mX++XoPTWOMz4C7xZsvmv6Jn3mIGBoeP+rXefl8+SNdGZtsSINgWDOUqDea2+10kTniCsBg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-08-06T21:00:50.145035Z"},"content_sha256":"6ceb29f62735baaddeca2f5d6ec70442ea0f0f686f98ff19dcc9c05975f12ac1","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:6ceb29f62735baaddeca2f5d6ec70442ea0f0f686f98ff19dcc9c05975f12ac1"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2021:3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Contracts for acquiring information","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Aubrey Clark, Giovanni Reggiani","submitted_at":"2021-03-05T19:38:07Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of output, a state-dependent transfer, and an optimal distortion. Under this decomposition: 1) the fraction of output paid is increasing in the set of experiments available to the agent, 2) the state-dependent transfer indexes contract payments to account for differences in output between states, 3) the optimal distortion exploits complementarities in the cost of in"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2103.03911","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2103.03911/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"J2cq50YaHi8zY04NuHSBy4w+aM3x/j7rY2sqzKnnskpLieyZiQ25m8c4fVIvoIWC92f4zMXeA5p+HcJjx1VJBQ==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-08-06T21:00:50.145526Z"},"content_sha256":"e23c6525c2c662234a7463795c9ceaa7c615f912ac91e0d4e56715cbed388a3c","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:e23c6525c2c662234a7463795c9ceaa7c615f912ac91e0d4e56715cbed388a3c"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-08-06T21:00:50Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2021:3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2OWMJG2EDSQF","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"4176335cb17092b6b520b54d50d7b7676258384780f35714ba01b37efca0e8f5","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2021-03-05T19:38:07Z","title_canon_sha256":"6975a18b265a4929aabf7d7179e471ff1ad62a8c100dbda3311ed73c6d732fe6"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2103.03911","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2103.03911","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2103.03911v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2103.03911","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"3YFBAJ7LZ3BJ","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"3YFBAJ7LZ3BJEU2O","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"3YFBAJ7L","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:e23c6525c2c662234a7463795c9ceaa7c615f912ac91e0d4e56715cbed388a3c","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"integrity":{"available":true,"clean":true,"detectors_run":[],"endpoint":"/pith/2103.03911/integrity.json","findings":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938","summary":{"advisory":0,"by_detector":{},"critical":0,"informational":0}},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of output, a state-dependent transfer, and an optimal distortion. Under this decomposition: 1) the fraction of output paid is increasing in the set of experiments available to the agent, 2) the state-dependent transfer indexes contract payments to account for differences in output between states, 3) the optimal distortion exploits complementarities in the cost of in","authors_text":"Aubrey Clark, Giovanni Reggiani","cross_cats":[],"headline":"","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2021-03-05T19:38:07Z","title":"Contracts for acquiring information"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2103.03911","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:6ceb29f62735baaddeca2f5d6ec70442ea0f0f686f98ff19dcc9c05975f12ac1","target":"record","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"4176335cb17092b6b520b54d50d7b7676258384780f35714ba01b37efca0e8f5","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2021-03-05T19:38:07Z","title_canon_sha256":"6975a18b265a4929aabf7d7179e471ff1ad62a8c100dbda3311ed73c6d732fe6"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2103.03911","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"de0a1027ebcec292534eb3126d10728168d9ede67d59c6cc9fe6985bf5cbbc4f","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"de0a1027ebcec292534eb3126d10728168d9ede67d59c6cc9fe6985bf5cbbc4f","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43.841215Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43.841215Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"wTFZ9TZ87fC1yFFuLKYu9+3UMNP2VrfOcrOcfXtGHTksS13hRSRcL7wgF5n8fmdEnUfZIwXE1MidqRgrMUONBQ==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-07-05T02:20:43.841632Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"2103.03911","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:6ceb29f62735baaddeca2f5d6ec70442ea0f0f686f98ff19dcc9c05975f12ac1","sha256:e23c6525c2c662234a7463795c9ceaa7c615f912ac91e0d4e56715cbed388a3c"],"state_sha256":"4ded982c2883adfdf1bb83b5ca9f2e9fffc472d9db973490b5725c0bed96ad56"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"2DmS6N4apP9cQTVKDsHrSaPpUXONgzeWmiJJX1GFFb71mR4W1YIQx26Daa573i7es4Zp6zYWJQj9Ch+W81ctDw==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-08-06T21:00:50.150299Z","bundle_sha256":"506fbbbf69ad976ba7b9ea14ed8f0c1f001ad8fe683e352a8aa03908aab3dcc2"}}