{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2018:45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2","short_pith_number":"pith:45ZOUPG6","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1803.09508","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2018-03-26T11:15:55Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"a923da94b279da07b136938fc2768ffdb17de80a93f81a33e3a1e11dc4df5eea","abstract_canon_sha256":"53041449e358d2940f4612c87651566c1807643829b3767e62cbb4ac1d02a636"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"e772ea3cde4c54b3aa4bd238de2ff0969fe0f1f771d64c38e0a51356ea9c2c01","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1803.09508","version":1},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1803.09508","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1803.09508v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1803.09508","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"45ZOUPG6JRKL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"45ZOUPG6","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:05Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2018:45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1803.09508","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2018-03-26T11:15:55Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"a923da94b279da07b136938fc2768ffdb17de80a93f81a33e3a1e11dc4df5eea","abstract_canon_sha256":"53041449e358d2940f4612c87651566c1807643829b3767e62cbb4ac1d02a636"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"e772ea3cde4c54b3aa4bd238de2ff0969fe0f1f771d64c38e0a51356ea9c2c01","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40.355199Z","signature_b64":"qasv4Ki3CiAJvbhCREL8L2RVnOEH1tiv0eUnDRxGXWx1rB/Fbt7LjLPa/ihVbzqQI04z18J/lh3frnb+0WzbCg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"e772ea3cde4c54b3aa4bd238de2ff0969fe0f1f771d64c38e0a51356ea9c2c01","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40.354815Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40.354815Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"1803.09508","source_version":1,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"jo35M6T6VOLdVPde3ihWU4hLeuSxApw5sEN1TR5cnsCFJNUZJLYANnRocepGopltiqnYp0xhicGGnUtQo1Y2Dg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-28T14:59:12.376941Z"},"content_sha256":"f39383186c726abd2fd892cd52a38713afba1ca3fc7c50a1e1afc2d6c3bac031","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:f39383186c726abd2fd892cd52a38713afba1ca3fc7c50a1e1afc2d6c3bac031"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2018:45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Weilong Wang","submitted_at":"2018-03-26T11:15:55Z","abstract_excerpt":"Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill this gap by providing a finite-key security analysis for QKD which is valid against arbitrary information leakage from the state preparation process of the legitimate users. For this, we extend the techniques introduced in (New J. Phys. 18, 065008, (2016)) to the finite-key regime, and we evaluate t"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1803.09508","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"ggXIRqOfSvEnyl1JmbqAHnbl2AOg6lQZa6wEx4MGvQqDaxmgORaVnUoUJDecydebXz2MUDnpHVmmqO6Ayr3NAw==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-28T14:59:12.377394Z"},"content_sha256":"20f4b1ef8701c631c70dd3c75b3aea9ce3614376ac51fafae68b822a6cbaebef","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:20f4b1ef8701c631c70dd3c75b3aea9ce3614376ac51fafae68b822a6cbaebef"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-05-28T14:59:12Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2018:45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL2I4N4L7QS2","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"53041449e358d2940f4612c87651566c1807643829b3767e62cbb4ac1d02a636","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2018-03-26T11:15:55Z","title_canon_sha256":"a923da94b279da07b136938fc2768ffdb17de80a93f81a33e3a1e11dc4df5eea"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1803.09508","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1803.09508","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1803.09508v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1803.09508","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"45ZOUPG6JRKL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"45ZOUPG6JRKLHKSL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"45ZOUPG6","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:05Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:20f4b1ef8701c631c70dd3c75b3aea9ce3614376ac51fafae68b822a6cbaebef","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill this gap by providing a finite-key security analysis for QKD which is valid against arbitrary information leakage from the state preparation process of the legitimate users. For this, we extend the techniques introduced in (New J. Phys. 18, 065008, (2016)) to the finite-key regime, and we evaluate t","authors_text":"Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty, Weilong Wang","cross_cats":[],"headline":"","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2018-03-26T11:15:55Z","title":"Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1803.09508","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:f39383186c726abd2fd892cd52a38713afba1ca3fc7c50a1e1afc2d6c3bac031","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"53041449e358d2940f4612c87651566c1807643829b3767e62cbb4ac1d02a636","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2018-03-26T11:15:55Z","title_canon_sha256":"a923da94b279da07b136938fc2768ffdb17de80a93f81a33e3a1e11dc4df5eea"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1803.09508","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"e772ea3cde4c54b3aa4bd238de2ff0969fe0f1f771d64c38e0a51356ea9c2c01","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"e772ea3cde4c54b3aa4bd238de2ff0969fe0f1f771d64c38e0a51356ea9c2c01","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40.354815Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40.354815Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"qasv4Ki3CiAJvbhCREL8L2RVnOEH1tiv0eUnDRxGXWx1rB/Fbt7LjLPa/ihVbzqQI04z18J/lh3frnb+0WzbCg==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:06:40.355199Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"1803.09508","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:f39383186c726abd2fd892cd52a38713afba1ca3fc7c50a1e1afc2d6c3bac031","sha256:20f4b1ef8701c631c70dd3c75b3aea9ce3614376ac51fafae68b822a6cbaebef"],"state_sha256":"34ca2cca7e8b2e2a8430d12db1ee52d557583466385e0d52f503575a609e213b"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"TIDRjgR4dMPxOCy235hIc0lI7zL5kMnt9OkJwaQTPNsDpahk2Z9+6tHzWe7CO/1dJGzaYJMIJ9z20tueOUSsBw==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-28T14:59:12.379861Z","bundle_sha256":"0bc4847434c5e7765be310323d57a24da3e8e7d7521258a7fd6f1bbc9bb2742b"}}