{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2020:47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK","short_pith_number":"pith:47JD2CR3","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"e7d23d0a3b20587a5814b24afaee7092afcb6a5b3cd0d23f1dc33349aa6c186f","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2006.13598","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"A Survey of Published Attacks on Intel SGX","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Alexander Nilsson, Joakim Brorsson, Pegah Nikbakht Bideh","submitted_at":"2020-06-24T10:20:56Z","abstract_excerpt":"Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) to run code and operate sensitive data. SGX provides runtime hardware protection where both code and data are protected even if other code components are malicious. However, recently many attacks targeting SGX have been identified and introduced that can thwart the hardware defence provided by SGX. In this paper we present a survey of all attacks specifically targeting Intel SGX that are known to the authors, to date. We categorized the attacks based on their implementation details into 7 different categories."},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2006.13598","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.CR","submitted_at":"2020-06-24T10:20:56Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"88a7c53b9799900f5ad0bc7dce0e9ad43ebe4ca64c18017299825697494d3592","abstract_canon_sha256":"d02f88eab97364ae188a9d9a1156350027f63b7e30f9d2cfd5c5ef7aef2c0155"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102769Z","signature_b64":"1tma5oR+0Po0Y59RmP6miOdbgRYeu+pBi2O7/AqIQiQ7a+VZg9+U/XTQi0mNaaThOsDltma8Q1cxnYV0ZzYBDQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"e7d23d0a3b20587a5814b24afaee7092afcb6a5b3cd0d23f1dc33349aa6c186f","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102285Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102285Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"A Survey of Published Attacks on Intel SGX","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Alexander Nilsson, Joakim Brorsson, Pegah Nikbakht Bideh","submitted_at":"2020-06-24T10:20:56Z","abstract_excerpt":"Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) to run code and operate sensitive data. SGX provides runtime hardware protection where both code and data are protected even if other code components are malicious. However, recently many attacks targeting SGX have been identified and introduced that can thwart the hardware defence provided by SGX. In this paper we present a survey of all attacks specifically targeting Intel SGX that are known to the authors, to date. We categorized the attacks based on their implementation details into 7 different categories."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2006.13598","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2006.13598/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2006.13598","created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2006.13598v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2006.13598","created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"47JD2CR3EBMH","created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"47JD2CR3EBMHUWAU","created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"47JD2CR3","created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":2,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2603.00178","citing_title":"A TEE-Based Architecture for Confidential and Dependable Process Attestation in Authorship Verification","ref_index":24,"is_internal_anchor":false},{"citing_arxiv_id":"2605.07548","citing_title":"CCX: Enabling Unmodified Intel SGX Applications on Arm CCA","ref_index":74,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK","json":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/47JD2CR3"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/47JD2CR3","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2006.13598&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/47JD2CR3EBMHUWAUWJFPV3TQSK/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T01:13:18.102362+00:00"}