{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2012:5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN","short_pith_number":"pith:5IJCHXKP","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"ea1223dd4fa706b57d719077383041cb6e2726fb471a5d371bc6ab10517b6655","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1206.2448","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium in capacity allocation game for self-managed networks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.NI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dariusz G\\c{a}sior, Maciej Drwal","submitted_at":"2012-06-12T07:31:28Z","abstract_excerpt":"In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed framework decision-making entities are associated with individual transmission links, deciding on the way they split capacity among concurrent flows. An efficient decentralized algorithm is given for computing strongly Pareto-optimal strategies, constituting a pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we discuss the properties of the introduced game related to the Price"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1206.2448","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2012-06-12T07:31:28Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.NI"],"title_canon_sha256":"52df9b559308ca46b0c9a953cf48a6fb404766c5346ec1fe8ad2fee0e7c67234","abstract_canon_sha256":"64f21810286c3ab95c01e9e48d08eeb10e07ad936d40f365f0ba2ba2a3d96f6b"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.361494Z","signature_b64":"JRzzWdl+rN5X8d2yQB25YWux8zKcKUKItbFteE3NvW1vDO5T7KM1E9nGWj+tqi4W2npQY2Ve1mQkv5ZNC5JgAQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"ea1223dd4fa706b57d719077383041cb6e2726fb471a5d371bc6ab10517b6655","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360791Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360791Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium in capacity allocation game for self-managed networks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.NI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dariusz G\\c{a}sior, Maciej Drwal","submitted_at":"2012-06-12T07:31:28Z","abstract_excerpt":"In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed framework decision-making entities are associated with individual transmission links, deciding on the way they split capacity among concurrent flows. An efficient decentralized algorithm is given for computing strongly Pareto-optimal strategies, constituting a pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we discuss the properties of the introduced game related to the Price"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1206.2448","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1206.2448","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360912+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1206.2448v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360912+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1206.2448","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360912+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"5IJCHXKPU4DL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:53.410803+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LR","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:53.410803+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"5IJCHXKP","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:26:53.410803+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN","json":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/5IJCHXKP"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/5IJCHXKP","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1206.2448&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/5IJCHXKPU4DLK7LRSB3TQMCBZN/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360912+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T03:17:57.360912+00:00"}