{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2016:63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V","short_pith_number":"pith:63VEGH7Q","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"f6ea431ff0c5949f79bc865e21b880e5469c229a04824225ea3a0123071c41b5","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1608.01875","version":3},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Jason Hartline, Samuel Taggart","submitted_at":"2016-08-05T13:22:38Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In general (not necessarily downward-closed) single-parameter feasibility environments we prove that the family has low representation and generalization error. Specifically, polynomially many bid samples suffice to identify and run a mechanism that is $\\epsilon$-close in Bayes-Nash equilibrium revenue or welfare to that of the optimal truthful mechanism with high probability."},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1608.01875","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2016-08-05T13:22:38Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"a98e4d4a9fba9c72c65463455f3119b893e723b4cf6e9d147229a66b24bf4867","abstract_canon_sha256":"401e92072fa6351ac3d7bdf2df819158cf325d37aeba3cbb361af52b198b13be"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.258266Z","signature_b64":"YvzPXYBzyGEJO7Sv/npBnDgrHKXycNteXxfuflZ1g5PFWoyIQoZuuCh/y4L7Yh24uOaSUOUys0XtvbjKpSjvDQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"f6ea431ff0c5949f79bc865e21b880e5469c229a04824225ea3a0123071c41b5","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257539Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257539Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Jason Hartline, Samuel Taggart","submitted_at":"2016-08-05T13:22:38Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In general (not necessarily downward-closed) single-parameter feasibility environments we prove that the family has low representation and generalization error. Specifically, polynomially many bid samples suffice to identify and run a mechanism that is $\\epsilon$-close in Bayes-Nash equilibrium revenue or welfare to that of the optimal truthful mechanism with high probability."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1608.01875","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1608.01875","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257638+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1608.01875v3","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257638+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1608.01875","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257638+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"63VEGH7QYWKJ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:30:01.593930+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:30:01.593930+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"63VEGH7Q","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:30:01.593930+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V","json":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/63VEGH7Q"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/63VEGH7Q","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1608.01875&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/63VEGH7QYWKJ66N4QZPCDOEA4V/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257638+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-17T23:42:35.257638+00:00"}