{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2014:7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO","short_pith_number":"pith:7D7QIE5V","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"f8ff0413b5b17883056b60506db217c3b3ebcbbba545a77e91a182250fa4767a","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1405.3360","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"On the Nash Stability in the Hedonic Coalition Formation Games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Cengis Hasan, Eitan Altman, Jean-Marie Gorce","submitted_at":"2014-05-14T04:54:08Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper studies the Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games. We address the following issue: for a general problem formulation, is there any utility allocation method ensuring a Nash-stable partition? We propose the definition of the Nash-stable core. We study the conditions for having a non-empty Nash-stable core. More precisely, we show how relaxed efficiency in utility sharing method allows to ensure a non-empty Nash-stable core."},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1405.3360","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-05-14T04:54:08Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"b95cc0667539098f290783e65af8f3b933c820ea58326bf0f8bb52a885717951","abstract_canon_sha256":"cd59d3c1d5d0e7d9d7be400adb6be7d582bfe9b68e884112b83619ced12c43e3"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.631249Z","signature_b64":"1lKWESBK0xONRsJTztax/9Fta/E4RgX2LbVoHiAfR6zsmN1MzPosrjnkQC7oBb248ve3apjdEGorv6XgXCuPBQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"f8ff0413b5b17883056b60506db217c3b3ebcbbba545a77e91a182250fa4767a","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630396Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630396Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"On the Nash Stability in the Hedonic Coalition Formation Games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Cengis Hasan, Eitan Altman, Jean-Marie Gorce","submitted_at":"2014-05-14T04:54:08Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper studies the Nash stability in hedonic coalition formation games. We address the following issue: for a general problem formulation, is there any utility allocation method ensuring a Nash-stable partition? We propose the definition of the Nash-stable core. We study the conditions for having a non-empty Nash-stable core. More precisely, we show how relaxed efficiency in utility sharing method allows to ensure a non-empty Nash-stable core."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1405.3360","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1405.3360","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630551+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1405.3360v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630551+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1405.3360","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630551+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"7D7QIE5VWF4I","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16.859392+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16.859392+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"7D7QIE5V","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:16.859392+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO","json":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/7D7QIE5V"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/7D7QIE5V","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1405.3360&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/7D7QIE5VWF4IGBLLMBIG3MQXYO/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630551+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:31:36.630551+00:00"}