{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI","short_pith_number":"pith:AJ5DRALU","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"027a388174d8998154616c3b474d5da23e4b37d2d254fac0fda20697720d94fc","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1512.03543","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.DS"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Chaitanya Swamy, Umang Bhaskar, Young Kun Ko, Yu Cheng","submitted_at":"2015-12-11T07:46:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the optimization problem faced by a perfectly informed principal in a Bayesian game, who reveals information to the players about the state of nature to obtain a desirable equilibrium. This signaling problem is the natural design question motivated by uncertainty in games and has attracted much recent attention. We present new hardness results for signaling problems in (a) Bayesian two-player zero-sum games, and (b) Bayesian network routing games.\n  For Bayesian zero-sum games, when the principal seeks to maximize the equilibrium utility of a player, we show that it is NP-hard to obta"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1512.03543","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-12-11T07:46:04Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.DS"],"title_canon_sha256":"d6bdff601269ac37a459509cfa863d39cec85cf55dda5ca72f40143f42881e99","abstract_canon_sha256":"d193409450226a3bdaf81282934de9be71eef3672629532331dab65682bf2c5e"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488732Z","signature_b64":"q32GhBIsP+BCAQaDrf1AjYmhQtQJPVgmAlvNLw7LV740oaFL2LgD675ViVoWXabqQG0yAS9BELYQVn/UXZiEAg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"027a388174d8998154616c3b474d5da23e4b37d2d254fac0fda20697720d94fc","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488064Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488064Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing Games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.DS"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Chaitanya Swamy, Umang Bhaskar, Young Kun Ko, Yu Cheng","submitted_at":"2015-12-11T07:46:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study the optimization problem faced by a perfectly informed principal in a Bayesian game, who reveals information to the players about the state of nature to obtain a desirable equilibrium. This signaling problem is the natural design question motivated by uncertainty in games and has attracted much recent attention. We present new hardness results for signaling problems in (a) Bayesian two-player zero-sum games, and (b) Bayesian network routing games.\n  For Bayesian zero-sum games, when the principal seeks to maximize the equilibrium utility of a player, we show that it is NP-hard to obta"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1512.03543","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1512.03543","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488169+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1512.03543v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488169+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1512.03543","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488169+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"AJ5DRALU3CMY","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:10.953037+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDB","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:10.953037+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"AJ5DRALU","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:10.953037+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI","json":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/AJ5DRALU"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/AJ5DRALU","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1512.03543&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/AJ5DRALU3CMYCVDBNQ5UOTK5UI/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488169+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T01:00:53.488169+00:00"}