{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2025:AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A","short_pith_number":"pith:AS3Z5NIJ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"04b79eb509557c8628fe929925036be010c505c9abd69787898820dd23203574","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2505.08317","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Stationary Mean-Field Games of Singular Control under Knightian Uncertainty","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"math.OC","authors_text":"Giorgio Ferrari, Ioannis Tzouanas","submitted_at":"2025-05-13T07:49:02Z","abstract_excerpt":"In this work, we study a class of stationary mean-field games of singular stochastic control under model uncertainty. The representative agent adjusts the dynamics of an It\\^o diffusion via one-sided singular stochastic control, aiming to maximize a long-term average expected profit criterion. The mean-field interaction is of scalar type through the stationary distribution of the population. Due to the presence of uncertainty, the problem involves the study of a stochastic (zero-sum) game, where the decision maker chooses the \"best\" singular control policy, while the adversarial player selects"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2505.08317","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"math.OC","submitted_at":"2025-05-13T07:49:02Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"57e013c309b02752cc19e489f25beed33d68326d5678e772657aab2bd609cdb1","abstract_canon_sha256":"bcd5de720bb19c5cb8aa546b2056cb503b72f1d46e2e692feea9f93062e52705"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664529Z","signature_b64":"qvWDvuRtTIkBXTG53+rTfN5B5Ndwf+F3HnTBoOSuN9IyllvZhQV59aLAWdyb0Q8d5Pu7Lz8IXafX5UrTeaOmAg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"04b79eb509557c8628fe929925036be010c505c9abd69787898820dd23203574","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664022Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664022Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Stationary Mean-Field Games of Singular Control under Knightian Uncertainty","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"math.OC","authors_text":"Giorgio Ferrari, Ioannis Tzouanas","submitted_at":"2025-05-13T07:49:02Z","abstract_excerpt":"In this work, we study a class of stationary mean-field games of singular stochastic control under model uncertainty. The representative agent adjusts the dynamics of an It\\^o diffusion via one-sided singular stochastic control, aiming to maximize a long-term average expected profit criterion. The mean-field interaction is of scalar type through the stationary distribution of the population. Due to the presence of uncertainty, the problem involves the study of a stochastic (zero-sum) game, where the decision maker chooses the \"best\" singular control policy, while the adversarial player selects"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2505.08317","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2505.08317/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2505.08317","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2505.08317v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2505.08317","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"AS3Z5NIJKV6I","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"AS3Z5NIJ","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2507.11632","citing_title":"Turnpike properties in linear quadratic Gaussian N-player differential games","ref_index":35,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A","json":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/AS3Z5NIJ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/AS3Z5NIJ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2505.08317&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/AS3Z5NIJKV6IMKH6SKMSKA3L4A/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T11:02:28.664083+00:00"}