{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2018:AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX","short_pith_number":"pith:AZF556OU","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"064bdef9d45036498ee4826f966986bde011dfa7fbdd65c764b9656f33679d91","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1802.03669","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"The Power Allocation Game on A Network: A Paradox","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.SI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"A. Stephen Morse, Yuke Li","submitted_at":"2018-02-11T00:38:11Z","abstract_excerpt":"The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit emerging from another distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in \\cite{allocation}. The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as some price of"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1802.03669","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2018-02-11T00:38:11Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.SI"],"title_canon_sha256":"2cc38960a03479af7ba3013bfe267778a70869801e1d075542592b0eceab2f47","abstract_canon_sha256":"d5de039a0dcb6bab68e4c56882550c802b0fdce2245809d1e6c4aafcc13839e8"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.818676Z","signature_b64":"k7XJ6NyZqN4HVf/YUxM4mcOlJAXzPEMLdBbGR9RrUskKmt8gU/lx18SuQWONFIAGjbAfyQz0X/2+j1l3EQ1lDQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"064bdef9d45036498ee4826f966986bde011dfa7fbdd65c764b9656f33679d91","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.817980Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.817980Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"The Power Allocation Game on A Network: A Paradox","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.SI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"A. Stephen Morse, Yuke Li","submitted_at":"2018-02-11T00:38:11Z","abstract_excerpt":"The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit emerging from another distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in \\cite{allocation}. The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as some price of"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1802.03669","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1802.03669","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.818091+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1802.03669v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.818091+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1802.03669","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.818091+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"AZF556OUKA3E","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:13.499390+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"AZF556OUKA3ETDXE","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:13.499390+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"AZF556OU","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:13.499390+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX","json":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/AZF556OU"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/AZF556OU","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1802.03669&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/AZF556OUKA3ETDXEQJXZM2MGXX/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.818091+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:23:50.818091+00:00"}