{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2018:B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M","short_pith_number":"pith:B2GD2FEU","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"0e8c3d1494a92fc5cbb3b4c6735a67fb03e1e4b8b17d244479b092b17c17bc2d","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1812.04848","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Optimal Prizes for All-Pay Contests in Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.MA","authors_text":"Hwee-Pink Tan, Sajal K. Das, Salil S. Kanhere, Tie Luo","submitted_at":"2018-12-12T08:43:12Z","abstract_excerpt":"Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing campaigns. We cast the problem in a new, asymmetric all-pay contest model with incomplete information, where an arbitrary n of users exert irrevocable effort to compete for a prize tuple. The prize tuple is an array of prize functions as opposed to a single constant prize typically used by conventional contests. We design an optimal contest that (a) induces the m"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1812.04848","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.MA","submitted_at":"2018-12-12T08:43:12Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"title_canon_sha256":"81745c51bcb1a2033fad62ce735162e01ce18a39018ca0d732174468c9f211b0","abstract_canon_sha256":"d8a587e5c738f7943126bd88b4b6ff9e7321c477b14120db335753fe5afdfd1d"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.158623Z","signature_b64":"wkdiHWpIMu3TWJ3AvkutonIpRcrT9NHV+oNArSCsSBbdP8D3jkih/CuYPZNN579/sbKYfYhIHyEZ1gJd2br6CA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"0e8c3d1494a92fc5cbb3b4c6735a67fb03e1e4b8b17d244479b092b17c17bc2d","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.157910Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.157910Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Optimal Prizes for All-Pay Contests in Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.MA","authors_text":"Hwee-Pink Tan, Sajal K. Das, Salil S. Kanhere, Tie Luo","submitted_at":"2018-12-12T08:43:12Z","abstract_excerpt":"Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing campaigns. We cast the problem in a new, asymmetric all-pay contest model with incomplete information, where an arbitrary n of users exert irrevocable effort to compete for a prize tuple. The prize tuple is an array of prize functions as opposed to a single constant prize typically used by conventional contests. We design an optimal contest that (a) induces the m"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1812.04848","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1812.04848","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.158022+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1812.04848v1","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.158022+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1812.04848","created_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.158022+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"B2GD2FEUVEX4","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:13.499390+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5T","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:13.499390+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"B2GD2FEU","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:32:13.499390+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M","json":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/B2GD2FEU"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/B2GD2FEU","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1812.04848&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/B2GD2FEUVEX4LS5TWTDHGWTH7M/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.158022+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-17T23:58:27.158022+00:00"}