{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2017:B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO","short_pith_number":"pith:B2P3X2CS","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"0e9fbbe852205169bfdc6480f7951babb80e6829483b6bb5880c2b42941172bf","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1705.02957","version":5},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Game Theoretic Dynamic Channel Allocation for Frequency-Selective Interference Channels","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","math.IT"],"primary_cat":"cs.IT","authors_text":"Amir Leshem, Ilai Bistritz","submitted_at":"2017-05-08T16:29:27Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider the problem of distributed channel allocation in large networks under the frequency-selective interference channel. Performance is measured by the weighted sum of achievable rates. Our proposed algorithm is a modified Fictitious Play algorithm that can be implemented distributedly and its stable points are the pure Nash equilibria of a given game. Our goal is to design a utility function for a non-cooperative game such that all of its pure Nash equilibria have close to optimal global performance. This will make the algorithm close to optimal while requiring no communication between"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1705.02957","kind":"arxiv","version":5},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.IT","submitted_at":"2017-05-08T16:29:27Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT","math.IT"],"title_canon_sha256":"53ed627d5a46042668969546cd1803206fb8db09b8ecad68cb0a9c1766a74d42","abstract_canon_sha256":"5ebee51077951a39952719303b558f9c7864649afb62e7e4831c15125349bbfd"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507963Z","signature_b64":"jG2CUuwMYuCHPTLmvRtfNrv9uVLKiZk4m0zO6obniZZ/0IlRHX+ZuQtC8RcFMOHfuyEOZTKpgIQGMVWgszrSDA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"0e9fbbe852205169bfdc6480f7951babb80e6829483b6bb5880c2b42941172bf","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507391Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507391Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Game Theoretic Dynamic Channel Allocation for Frequency-Selective Interference Channels","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","math.IT"],"primary_cat":"cs.IT","authors_text":"Amir Leshem, Ilai Bistritz","submitted_at":"2017-05-08T16:29:27Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider the problem of distributed channel allocation in large networks under the frequency-selective interference channel. Performance is measured by the weighted sum of achievable rates. Our proposed algorithm is a modified Fictitious Play algorithm that can be implemented distributedly and its stable points are the pure Nash equilibria of a given game. Our goal is to design a utility function for a non-cooperative game such that all of its pure Nash equilibria have close to optimal global performance. This will make the algorithm close to optimal while requiring no communication between"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1705.02957","kind":"arxiv","version":5},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1705.02957","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507481+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1705.02957v5","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507481+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1705.02957","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507481+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"B2P3X2CSEBIW","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:31:08.081275+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:31:08.081275+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"B2P3X2CS","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:31:08.081275+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO","json":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/B2P3X2CS"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/B2P3X2CS","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1705.02957&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/B2P3X2CSEBIWTP64MSAPPFI3VO/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507481+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:01:10.507481+00:00"}