{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2024:BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV","short_pith_number":"pith:BAO3YLBT","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"081dbc2c3380c3e3350fbcec743c951d4cea24599a6db465675cdefa24fea84d","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2401.04939","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Partition-form Cooperative Games in Two-Echelon Supply Chains","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Gurkirat Wadhwa, Tushar Shankar Walunj, Veeraruna Kavitha","submitted_at":"2024-01-10T05:29:05Z","abstract_excerpt":"Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across echelons. The agents may want to collaborate with others in pursuit of attracting higher demand and thereby improving their own revenue. We consider one supplier (at a higher echelon) and two manufacturers (at a lower echelon and facing the customers) and study the collaborations that are `stable'; the main differentiator from the existing studies in supply chain literatu"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2401.04939","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2024-01-10T05:29:05Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"18b8fecc29d3fbe9db7bd7e888dbf3aa741c2224a5cc1ecf553fc830c10f62d5","abstract_canon_sha256":"27dc56c618634f41c3fcbd32d0f15f68b243fcfb5afd72800a1486b7ff51b0a9"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.790096Z","signature_b64":"XFcQ6VB8cXXJoaLiq2eI+aluVfb7XWfvUbPi/eV3Sojh8PXUYIUv/lXWvmzE04YQqvM8nf399sH1cMlpnuiqDg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"081dbc2c3380c3e3350fbcec743c951d4cea24599a6db465675cdefa24fea84d","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789691Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789691Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Partition-form Cooperative Games in Two-Echelon Supply Chains","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Gurkirat Wadhwa, Tushar Shankar Walunj, Veeraruna Kavitha","submitted_at":"2024-01-10T05:29:05Z","abstract_excerpt":"Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across echelons. The agents may want to collaborate with others in pursuit of attracting higher demand and thereby improving their own revenue. We consider one supplier (at a higher echelon) and two manufacturers (at a lower echelon and facing the customers) and study the collaborations that are `stable'; the main differentiator from the existing studies in supply chain literatu"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2401.04939","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2401.04939/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2401.04939","created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2401.04939v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2401.04939","created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"BAO3YLBTQDB6","created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIP","created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"BAO3YLBT","created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2506.17239","citing_title":"Price equilibria with positive margins in loyal-strategic markets with discrete prices","ref_index":2,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV","json":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/BAO3YLBT"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/BAO3YLBT","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2401.04939&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/BAO3YLBTQDB6GNIPXTWHIPEVDV/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T07:32:00.789749+00:00"}