{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2021:BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ","short_pith_number":"pith:BICC5ZWW","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"0a042ee6d64e011def3e0d99979e346661e0035fd742aa15129a652d03d2ca5d","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2106.13249","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Modeling the Mistakes of Boundedly Rational Agents Within a Bayesian Theory of Mind","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["q-bio.NC"],"primary_cat":"cs.AI","authors_text":"Arwa Alanqary, Gloria Z. Lin, Joie Le, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Tan Zhi-Xuan, Vikash K. Mansinghka","submitted_at":"2021-06-24T18:00:03Z","abstract_excerpt":"When inferring the goals that others are trying to achieve, people intuitively understand that others might make mistakes along the way. This is crucial for activities such as teaching, offering assistance, and deciding between blame or forgiveness. However, Bayesian models of theory of mind have generally not accounted for these mistakes, instead modeling agents as mostly optimal in achieving their goals. As a result, they are unable to explain phenomena like locking oneself out of one's house, or losing a game of chess. Here, we extend the Bayesian Theory of Mind framework to model boundedly"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2106.13249","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.AI","submitted_at":"2021-06-24T18:00:03Z","cross_cats_sorted":["q-bio.NC"],"title_canon_sha256":"9c47366df772ffaa6ca0cd650b2800962d87b8d75cebd8b68c0024e032e11b0a","abstract_canon_sha256":"bc01fa1f7669f32bbf39e0eccdddd0445aa03e0f88acf65eabf6a582b0d7e7c7"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455867Z","signature_b64":"UA2KCGyx8Kqu/qIZsgaUVOTRhXeAqkeEuujNddtkHJfLFyQ3wdrmB/Zh8h0L5ryc79D181GZDfYCAs8y/ljDDA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"0a042ee6d64e011def3e0d99979e346661e0035fd742aa15129a652d03d2ca5d","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455391Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455391Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Modeling the Mistakes of Boundedly Rational Agents Within a Bayesian Theory of Mind","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["q-bio.NC"],"primary_cat":"cs.AI","authors_text":"Arwa Alanqary, Gloria Z. Lin, Joie Le, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Tan Zhi-Xuan, Vikash K. Mansinghka","submitted_at":"2021-06-24T18:00:03Z","abstract_excerpt":"When inferring the goals that others are trying to achieve, people intuitively understand that others might make mistakes along the way. This is crucial for activities such as teaching, offering assistance, and deciding between blame or forgiveness. However, Bayesian models of theory of mind have generally not accounted for these mistakes, instead modeling agents as mostly optimal in achieving their goals. As a result, they are unable to explain phenomena like locking oneself out of one's house, or losing a game of chess. Here, we extend the Bayesian Theory of Mind framework to model boundedly"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2106.13249","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2106.13249/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2106.13249","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2106.13249v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2106.13249","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"BICC5ZWWJYAR","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"BICC5ZWW","created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2505.19376","citing_title":"Belief Attribution as Mental Explanation: The Role of Accuracy, Informativity, and Causality","ref_index":1,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ","json":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/BICC5ZWW"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/BICC5ZWW","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2106.13249&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/BICC5ZWWJYAR33Z6BWMZPHRUMZ/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T02:52:17.455453+00:00"}