{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2026:BQNWHE4SHBWHG2W66R3MOD72EV","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"182468d38741e424191735fa4d951b5c1d6bacd4eb595a67d3ba07d93d1cd4db","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.MA"],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","primary_cat":"nlin.AO","submitted_at":"2026-05-17T15:45:47Z","title_canon_sha256":"c476f1b3f43dc3a1f66d12174e4e82734094b81bdfcc494a149e5cadf3962893"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2605.17510","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2605.17510","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2605.17510v1","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2605.17510","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"BQNWHE4SHBWH","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"BQNWHE4SHBWHG2W6","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"BQNWHE4S","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:dd9e7e370de81837460fb9f65e1f744c76639207bf1adeed30a7b42dd99a9c56","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C1","kind":"strongest_claim","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","text":"both families exhibit a narrow mid-scale regime that supports sustained rule adoption, diverse amendments, and balanced consensus. Smaller models tend to remain rule-inert, whereas larger models often converge on restrictive voting patterns, and heterogeneous mixed-size groups collapse into veto-driven gridlock."},{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C2","kind":"weakest_assumption","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","text":"The Nomic game implementation and prompting setup used here faithfully models general collective adaptation in LLM societies without introducing artifacts from specific rule templates, voting mechanics, or agent interaction protocols that would not appear in other self-governance scenarios."},{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C3","kind":"one_line_summary","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","text":"LLM societies in Nomic show non-monotonic collective adaptation peaking at mid-scales, with smaller models rule-inert and larger ones restrictive."},{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C4","kind":"headline","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","text":"Collective rule adaptation in LLM societies peaks at intermediate model sizes"}],"snapshot_sha256":"acafd3417e075f2276f0ccae21aff515d42b635cbb7c3aff1c5269548dc8ed3f"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"integrity":{"available":true,"clean":true,"detectors_run":[{"findings_count":0,"name":"doi_title_agreement","ran_at":"2026-05-19T22:31:19.612253Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0"},{"findings_count":0,"name":"doi_compliance","ran_at":"2026-05-19T22:31:09.110173Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0"},{"findings_count":0,"name":"claim_evidence","ran_at":"2026-05-19T21:41:57.656180Z","status":"completed","version":"1.0.0"},{"findings_count":0,"name":"ai_meta_artifact","ran_at":"2026-05-19T21:33:23.631021Z","status":"skipped","version":"1.0.0"}],"endpoint":"/pith/2605.17510/integrity.json","findings":[],"snapshot_sha256":"5900419e3beee485eb18696a1a291a629c41e199e2d69dda96700e255e1aeb17","summary":{"advisory":0,"by_detector":{},"critical":0,"informational":0}},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"We study group decision-making in artificial societies where the rules of play are themselves subject to collective amendment. Using the self-amending game Nomic, we compare multiple scales across two LLM families and find that collective adaptation does not improve monotonically with model size. Instead, both families exhibit a narrow mid-scale regime that supports sustained rule adoption, diverse amendments, and balanced consensus. Smaller models tend to remain rule-inert, whereas larger models often converge on restrictive voting patterns, and heterogeneous mixed-size groups collapse into v","authors_text":"Gen Masumoto, Kazuya Horibe, Masaomi Hatakeyama, Peter Romero, Takashi Hashimoto","cross_cats":["cs.MA"],"headline":"Collective rule adaptation in LLM societies peaks at intermediate model sizes","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","primary_cat":"nlin.AO","submitted_at":"2026-05-17T15:45:47Z","title":"Scale-Dependent Collective Adaptation in Self-Amending LLM Societies: A Cross-Family Study of Emergent Governance"},"references":{"count":80,"internal_anchors":9,"resolved_work":80,"sample":[{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":1,"title":"Qwen3.5: Towards native multimodal agents (2026)","work_id":"a6f29181-d9e5-437a-b32e-223fa4b8c97b","year":2026},{"cited_arxiv_id":"2503.19786","doi":"","is_internal_anchor":true,"ref_index":2,"title":"Gemma 3 Technical Report","work_id":"f93e08bf-9e96-409b-8ac6-b8385fd17fd7","year":2025},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":3,"title":"Axelrod,The Evolution of Cooperation(Basic Books, 1984)","work_id":"0a57a325-610c-4a70-90bf-35eac3c53922","year":1984},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":4,"title":"Ostrom,Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action(Cambridge university press, 1990)","work_id":"913f90d0-acac-41d3-ac36-2f181521ae46","year":1990},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":5,"title":"North,Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance(Cam- bridge University Press, 1990)","work_id":"dde81fa0-6032-4c19-80ce-1dac2f5812f5","year":1990}],"snapshot_sha256":"5d700c092d0f1c8e1bce9b12bd14c7c01778586e48e4debcf0c7a9e2c099d41f"},"source":{"id":"2605.17510","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":"2026-05-19T22:26:00.282231Z","id":"f585fe22-2192-4352-bba0-15871bc8b80e","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"one_line_summary":"LLM societies in Nomic show non-monotonic collective adaptation peaking at mid-scales, with smaller models rule-inert and larger ones restrictive.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","pith_extraction_headline":"Collective rule adaptation in LLM societies peaks at intermediate model sizes","strongest_claim":"both families exhibit a narrow mid-scale regime that supports sustained rule adoption, diverse amendments, and balanced consensus. Smaller models tend to remain rule-inert, whereas larger models often converge on restrictive voting patterns, and heterogeneous mixed-size groups collapse into veto-driven gridlock.","weakest_assumption":"The Nomic game implementation and prompting setup used here faithfully models general collective adaptation in LLM societies without introducing artifacts from specific rule templates, voting mechanics, or agent interaction protocols that would not appear in other self-governance scenarios."}},"verdict_id":"f585fe22-2192-4352-bba0-15871bc8b80e"}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:be62bb41510e1bae563a21771110f76a812e339fd55eabcc7811a65debb61e70","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"182468d38741e424191735fa4d951b5c1d6bacd4eb595a67d3ba07d93d1cd4db","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.MA"],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/","primary_cat":"nlin.AO","submitted_at":"2026-05-17T15:45:47Z","title_canon_sha256":"c476f1b3f43dc3a1f66d12174e4e82734094b81bdfcc494a149e5cadf3962893"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2605.17510","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"0c1b639392386c736adef476c70ffa25588f7d34ed27a694489166d5c9dedd14","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"0c1b639392386c736adef476c70ffa25588f7d34ed27a694489166d5c9dedd14","first_computed_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43.000836Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43.000836Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"/odACyLWpZ8634N3rMWWC5BhsaEiEMvX01UxbxnbRT96X+EtGlinAwPQkOVot01kGT0CWhxLnjLeO/p8A/qIDg==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-20T00:04:43.001683Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"2605.17510","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:be62bb41510e1bae563a21771110f76a812e339fd55eabcc7811a65debb61e70","sha256:dd9e7e370de81837460fb9f65e1f744c76639207bf1adeed30a7b42dd99a9c56"],"state_sha256":"1cc694cc2e39e30a3f729e63adebe91e1c165ef64dd5b374b22823efe77f7203"}