{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2023:CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z","short_pith_number":"pith:CCFVIOGQ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"108b5438d0070b18b81c96a310ee2dee464517d9e866e34a8a5ab8544a46a0d1","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2307.07297","version":3},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Game Dynamics and Equilibrium Computation in the Population Protocol Model","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.DC","authors_text":"Dan Alistarh, John Lazarsfeld, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Mehrdad Karrabi","submitted_at":"2023-07-14T12:20:32Z","abstract_excerpt":"We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a payoff from an underlying utility function, and they can subsequently update their strategies according to a fixed local algorithm. In this setting, we ask how the distribution over agent strategies evolves over a sequence of interactions, and we introduce a new distributional equilibrium concept to quantify the quality of such distributions. As an initial exam"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2307.07297","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.DC","submitted_at":"2023-07-14T12:20:32Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT"],"title_canon_sha256":"a92773f79acf89e48d9ee72ff8f933439222e24e15706b13f70a2507da6797a7","abstract_canon_sha256":"b3fad13b5bf402a9df5914b4f4941e4617a2d94069796ebf67f35a480d2b20d8"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567795Z","signature_b64":"te2JpancWn9x7Ez/aNadUnaDAtr4IdA51ifpZKKiXSdd4RHND4fs4HHOuN1mKJFSvKPysuZb9GfNCQ123ADJDg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"108b5438d0070b18b81c96a310ee2dee464517d9e866e34a8a5ab8544a46a0d1","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567248Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567248Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Game Dynamics and Equilibrium Computation in the Population Protocol Model","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT"],"primary_cat":"cs.DC","authors_text":"Dan Alistarh, John Lazarsfeld, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Mehrdad Karrabi","submitted_at":"2023-07-14T12:20:32Z","abstract_excerpt":"We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a payoff from an underlying utility function, and they can subsequently update their strategies according to a fixed local algorithm. In this setting, we ask how the distribution over agent strategies evolves over a sequence of interactions, and we introduce a new distributional equilibrium concept to quantify the quality of such distributions. As an initial exam"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2307.07297","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2307.07297/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2307.07297","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2307.07297v3","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2307.07297","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"CCFVIOGQA4FR","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"CCFVIOGQ","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z","json":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/CCFVIOGQ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/CCFVIOGQ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2307.07297&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/CCFVIOGQA4FRROA4S2RRB3RN5Z/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T08:20:23.567339+00:00"}