{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2015:CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT","short_pith_number":"pith:CIWQL6X6","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1506.07472","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","submitted_at":"2015-06-24T17:16:36Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"032acd56d7df5bcba1d514d27705e5c8be245dab1398bc3c606a9c78bad55a86","abstract_canon_sha256":"d8bc86d51c21fe1d806af521182d950e5e9fa965937fd94c49fe8cd31336a27f"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"122d05fafeef9f151aee732021f31b54fbb232309fcb94f78fc69cdb561f6c41","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1506.07472","version":1},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1506.07472","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1506.07472v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1506.07472","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"CIWQL6X656PR","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:14Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"CIWQL6X656PRKGXO","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:14Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"CIWQL6X6","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:14Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2015:CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1506.07472","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","submitted_at":"2015-06-24T17:16:36Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"032acd56d7df5bcba1d514d27705e5c8be245dab1398bc3c606a9c78bad55a86","abstract_canon_sha256":"d8bc86d51c21fe1d806af521182d950e5e9fa965937fd94c49fe8cd31336a27f"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"122d05fafeef9f151aee732021f31b54fbb232309fcb94f78fc69cdb561f6c41","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52.820600Z","signature_b64":"8UvJwlugmzdfDvWmZnfKMGoPiXDWcgFCA30LhI50xtmfGDV2ZLPaOP+Ulft8YCT6CKx17wzb7bqZoBuqCQaVAA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"122d05fafeef9f151aee732021f31b54fbb232309fcb94f78fc69cdb561f6c41","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52.820153Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52.820153Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"1506.07472","source_version":1,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"Esa4/DhOSJ2b7eOuTHOr5jK7AHCZBpQO63XaTfQHg+aM7zydHEx7zbMqs2qWCmkUBXRH0N10Wo2KGvzKRHjKBA==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-28T10:23:37.293688Z"},"content_sha256":"b820cb11cb237be408e4f71b35128d3db929840a78d0e5c852ce47b95d3472f4","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:b820cb11cb237be408e4f71b35128d3db929840a78d0e5c852ce47b95d3472f4"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2015:CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Asymmetric evolutionary games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","authors_text":"Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert","submitted_at":"2015-06-24T17:16:36Z","abstract_excerpt":"Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecologic"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1506.07472","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"w4v7K9lUExI4S+5ccJrF60JFPBC9lz7ShJ6S49vY5LSKEhz56KqpBAVE3Jn+imKgQxwY6jQFg0cNTBo+Q4b4DA==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-28T10:23:37.294033Z"},"content_sha256":"ee1594302244ad0d5e67035dba9e08d7e60b1659ec931e6a10843b72cf862b38","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:ee1594302244ad0d5e67035dba9e08d7e60b1659ec931e6a10843b72cf862b38"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-05-28T10:23:37Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2015:CIWQL6X656PRKGXOOMQCD4Y3KT","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"d8bc86d51c21fe1d806af521182d950e5e9fa965937fd94c49fe8cd31336a27f","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","submitted_at":"2015-06-24T17:16:36Z","title_canon_sha256":"032acd56d7df5bcba1d514d27705e5c8be245dab1398bc3c606a9c78bad55a86"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1506.07472","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1506.07472","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1506.07472v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1506.07472","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"CIWQL6X656PR","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:14Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"CIWQL6X656PRKGXO","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:14Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"CIWQL6X6","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:14Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:ee1594302244ad0d5e67035dba9e08d7e60b1659ec931e6a10843b72cf862b38","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecologic","authors_text":"Alex McAvoy, Christoph Hauert","cross_cats":[],"headline":"","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","submitted_at":"2015-06-24T17:16:36Z","title":"Asymmetric evolutionary games"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1506.07472","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:b820cb11cb237be408e4f71b35128d3db929840a78d0e5c852ce47b95d3472f4","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"d8bc86d51c21fe1d806af521182d950e5e9fa965937fd94c49fe8cd31336a27f","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-bio.PE","submitted_at":"2015-06-24T17:16:36Z","title_canon_sha256":"032acd56d7df5bcba1d514d27705e5c8be245dab1398bc3c606a9c78bad55a86"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1506.07472","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"122d05fafeef9f151aee732021f31b54fbb232309fcb94f78fc69cdb561f6c41","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"122d05fafeef9f151aee732021f31b54fbb232309fcb94f78fc69cdb561f6c41","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52.820153Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52.820153Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"8UvJwlugmzdfDvWmZnfKMGoPiXDWcgFCA30LhI50xtmfGDV2ZLPaOP+Ulft8YCT6CKx17wzb7bqZoBuqCQaVAA==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:15:52.820600Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"1506.07472","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:b820cb11cb237be408e4f71b35128d3db929840a78d0e5c852ce47b95d3472f4","sha256:ee1594302244ad0d5e67035dba9e08d7e60b1659ec931e6a10843b72cf862b38"],"state_sha256":"57e02816a6804c0ed787838d98621833994eda0602eb9fd64a932c687774c3da"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"9yeD7rvyIgVQjhl23X69VNaMu7w4h1DWL0KJ8rBZKYZmuDZNJP77iRgeHzbd/vjUohUGQuwOyeKqQQO7W5xGDQ==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-28T10:23:37.296049Z","bundle_sha256":"b07cbdeb560c909d27ec8137c77e1e2db4b68d1386dac319bdf75e3f50d13f7c"}}