{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2025:CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG","short_pith_number":"pith:CZ5LDGWH","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"167ab19ac73182cb05c3499710f51b41a390029e721061853d3f7262a53e8170","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2503.02464","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Approximate Equilibria in Nonconvex Markets: Theory and Evidence from European Electricity Auctions","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Thomas H\\\"ubner","submitted_at":"2025-03-04T10:18:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"A fundamental challenge in the design of nonconvex markets is the absence of existence guarantees for Walrasian equilibria. Despite this lack of guarantees, we observed that the European day-ahead electricity auction attained equilibrium on approximately 80% of days during 2023 in some countries, while in others, it occurred on about 10% of days. By analysing auction microdata, we attribute these differences to varying ratios of divisible (convex) bids versus indivisible (nonconvex) ones. To provide a theoretical foundation for this empirical observation, we refine classical approximate equili"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2503.02464","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"econ.TH","submitted_at":"2025-03-04T10:18:37Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"23a983add01f31b27df9109d4ef3e1ab69735c380bf4f08baa4df0206b626962","abstract_canon_sha256":"da5bf65acfee315a7aa56cd9da8f13e7758eb4c26d46073b35ed3fb5106d33ba"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863691Z","signature_b64":"2hHikSz2PTsoZGkpWGRlVMBa367Q2sBxbQVfZTqB1EKgoYxFrT6M/I4AXk2VO2Tg2cMSgxR9Tso2D3HHmHCFCg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"167ab19ac73182cb05c3499710f51b41a390029e721061853d3f7262a53e8170","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863256Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863256Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Approximate Equilibria in Nonconvex Markets: Theory and Evidence from European Electricity Auctions","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"econ.TH","authors_text":"Thomas H\\\"ubner","submitted_at":"2025-03-04T10:18:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"A fundamental challenge in the design of nonconvex markets is the absence of existence guarantees for Walrasian equilibria. Despite this lack of guarantees, we observed that the European day-ahead electricity auction attained equilibrium on approximately 80% of days during 2023 in some countries, while in others, it occurred on about 10% of days. By analysing auction microdata, we attribute these differences to varying ratios of divisible (convex) bids versus indivisible (nonconvex) ones. To provide a theoretical foundation for this empirical observation, we refine classical approximate equili"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2503.02464","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2503.02464/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2503.02464","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2503.02464v2","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2503.02464","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"CZ5LDGWHGGBM","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBOD","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"CZ5LDGWH","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":2,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2607.06316","citing_title":"Does Financial Trading Smooth Non-Convex Markets?","ref_index":30,"is_internal_anchor":true},{"citing_arxiv_id":"2604.13603","citing_title":"On the Design of Stochastic Electricity Auctions","ref_index":2,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG","json":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/CZ5LDGWH"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/CZ5LDGWH","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2503.02464&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/CZ5LDGWHGGBMWBODJGLRB5I3IG/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T11:48:47.863326+00:00"}