{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2014:D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D","short_pith_number":"pith:D67W6ISB","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"1fbf6f2241b682a2846efa81717909f8ed3c944dff25fcf942b29bddfcfad690","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1404.2514","version":4},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly:Part 1","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar","submitted_at":"2014-04-06T04:14:03Z","abstract_excerpt":"We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would quote without knowing the transmission qualities of its competitors' channels. Each secondary buys a channel depending on the price and the transmission quality a channel offers. We formulate the price selection problem as a non co-operative game with primaries as players. In the one-shot game, we show that there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium(NE) strategy p"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1404.2514","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-04-06T04:14:03Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"de5c914e829573e5c167de8b0be59ae0542d7bcf95970ec7f32fa5b4007bb71b","abstract_canon_sha256":"c8fc5a248a61ca67aa089a0e2dda5cfe73d76f9551c30da466ea7f43aa582ec2"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616992Z","signature_b64":"Yt+I9MfT+IYggrTtvuSYma7oC59PkU5UMF3ULJsdHz2p1qu3VWRPfYEDjooO5b/I5sXIGM8JkiWAykiRTnouBw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"1fbf6f2241b682a2846efa81717909f8ed3c944dff25fcf942b29bddfcfad690","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616212Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616212Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly:Part 1","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Arnob Ghosh, Saswati Sarkar","submitted_at":"2014-04-06T04:14:03Z","abstract_excerpt":"We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would quote without knowing the transmission qualities of its competitors' channels. Each secondary buys a channel depending on the price and the transmission quality a channel offers. We formulate the price selection problem as a non co-operative game with primaries as players. In the one-shot game, we show that there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium(NE) strategy p"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1404.2514","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1404.2514","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616347+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1404.2514v4","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616347+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1404.2514","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616347+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"D67W6ISBW2BK","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:25.294606+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:25.294606+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"D67W6ISB","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:25.294606+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D","json":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/D67W6ISB"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/D67W6ISB","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1404.2514&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/D67W6ISBW2BKFBDO7KAXC6IJ7D/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616347+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T02:03:55.616347+00:00"}