{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2024:DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I","short_pith_number":"pith:DGHDNDDQ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"198e368c70981a6e64eeb430dca93ae22a96b9a9e4fbad0ae65504471fe25992","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2409.05044","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"An Analysis of Logit Learning with the r-Lambert Function","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.SY"],"primary_cat":"eess.SY","authors_text":"Keith Paarporn, Ming Cao, Rory Gavin","submitted_at":"2024-09-08T09:51:16Z","abstract_excerpt":"The well-known replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes how population-level behaviors change over time when individuals make decisions using simple imitation learning rules. In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics based on a fundamentally different class of learning rules known as logit learning. Numerous previous studies on logit dynamics provide numerical evidence of bifurcations of multiple fixed points for several types of games. Our results here provide a more explicit analysis of the logit fixed points and their stability properties for the entire class of two-str"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2409.05044","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"eess.SY","submitted_at":"2024-09-08T09:51:16Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.SY"],"title_canon_sha256":"b0ed04217f6c11b2a393177f482ff30baa8f0417ff20ec0eb445848be157757a","abstract_canon_sha256":"571f8dda01cb14a1dce61200a2c7fa99e4922dc04aa392a027a8d96402cd99c2"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.165385Z","signature_b64":"8+kMzKcYeHBOLrBpbgZoKtAzygoUwYVKj+t/9oaEBjXsipNcy4YDB9A9/wFZdZ8/bUPm41sYmy/+zUhEAHHEAQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"198e368c70981a6e64eeb430dca93ae22a96b9a9e4fbad0ae65504471fe25992","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164859Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164859Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"An Analysis of Logit Learning with the r-Lambert Function","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.SY"],"primary_cat":"eess.SY","authors_text":"Keith Paarporn, Ming Cao, Rory Gavin","submitted_at":"2024-09-08T09:51:16Z","abstract_excerpt":"The well-known replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes how population-level behaviors change over time when individuals make decisions using simple imitation learning rules. In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics based on a fundamentally different class of learning rules known as logit learning. Numerous previous studies on logit dynamics provide numerical evidence of bifurcations of multiple fixed points for several types of games. Our results here provide a more explicit analysis of the logit fixed points and their stability properties for the entire class of two-str"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2409.05044","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2409.05044/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2409.05044","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2409.05044v2","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2409.05044","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"DGHDNDDQTANG","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHO","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"DGHDNDDQ","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2605.04340","citing_title":"Analysis of a Competitive Bivirus SIS Epidemic Model with Game Theoretic Social Distancing","ref_index":56,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I","json":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/DGHDNDDQ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/DGHDNDDQ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2409.05044&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/DGHDNDDQTANG4ZHOWQYNZKJ24I/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T10:14:45.164917+00:00"}