{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2021:FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L","short_pith_number":"pith:FUIWI3L6","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"2d11646d7e953dfc0097180e737b65e2c0f8d42701ca5891ebe113962b4d2824","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2112.11963","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Principal agent mean field games in REC markets","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"q-fin.MF","authors_text":"Arvind V Shrivats, Dena Firoozi, Sebastian Jaimungal","submitted_at":"2021-12-22T15:35:13Z","abstract_excerpt":"Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field canonically considers a single agent, the situation where multiple agents, or even an infinite amount of agents are contracted by a principal are growing in prominence and pose interesting and realistic problems. Here, agents form a Nash equilibrium among themselves, and a Stackelberg equilibrium between themselves as a collective and the principal.\n  We apply this fr"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2112.11963","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","primary_cat":"q-fin.MF","submitted_at":"2021-12-22T15:35:13Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"5bc9ea793891c99ef1cbeeee8254d222e797b04af31d4848eaacea6f108b244d","abstract_canon_sha256":"d2b0c3b5c5ccc573cb1804f25246bb2a79b9c62ffb0ed873113caf4354c48f92"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.214060Z","signature_b64":"COIsaEXSnK5jsJpBwh07P1wUUvk980fq88+NcNREyFD22pfAYW4iywqXkIp7IN8t3JkHHCYKrY/UDKAbONUDCw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"2d11646d7e953dfc0097180e737b65e2c0f8d42701ca5891ebe113962b4d2824","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213582Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213582Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Principal agent mean field games in REC markets","license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"q-fin.MF","authors_text":"Arvind V Shrivats, Dena Firoozi, Sebastian Jaimungal","submitted_at":"2021-12-22T15:35:13Z","abstract_excerpt":"Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field canonically considers a single agent, the situation where multiple agents, or even an infinite amount of agents are contracted by a principal are growing in prominence and pose interesting and realistic problems. Here, agents form a Nash equilibrium among themselves, and a Stackelberg equilibrium between themselves as a collective and the principal.\n  We apply this fr"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2112.11963","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2112.11963/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2112.11963","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2112.11963v2","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2112.11963","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"FUIWI3L6SU67","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"FUIWI3L6SU67YAEX","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"FUIWI3L6","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2209.03588","citing_title":"A Rank-Based Reward between a Principal and a Field of Agents: Application to Energy Savings","ref_index":3,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L","json":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/FUIWI3L6"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/FUIWI3L6","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2112.11963&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/FUIWI3L6SU67YAEXDAHHG63F4L/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T04:34:49.213639+00:00"}