{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2013:I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ","short_pith_number":"pith:I4NZE6OK","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"471b9279ca5f4192d8223569799c334a4e5ca08cadec78e0c88c757cdeb39ff8","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1311.0913","version":5},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Gil Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz, Reshef Meir","submitted_at":"2013-11-04T22:03:16Z","abstract_excerpt":"Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \\emph{bidding games}, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect equilibria (PSPE). In particular, we show that PSPEs form a semilattice, with a unique and natural \\emph{Bottom Equilibrium}.\n  Our main result shows that if only two actions available to the players in each node, then the Bottom Equilibrium has additional properties: (a) utilities are monotone in budget; (b) every outcome is Pareto-"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1311.0913","kind":"arxiv","version":5},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2013-11-04T22:03:16Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"7696b382e9426201acd340af47b72f7a8d7b976b7032848c8d8c3b6d5174df76","abstract_canon_sha256":"c7c8b8387831dc8dc7c8a881d384c04e5d9c24c4e06f568e1ebb32c1dc79ab9f"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.459600Z","signature_b64":"wWlFY0yOJstUfQjQL+bvKqOJADZBi6qR0UmDkz3MsMhwzqRB9lMhvlC6Byy1DibrECYETZ+jDjFbLejDzWPsDw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"471b9279ca5f4192d8223569799c334a4e5ca08cadec78e0c88c757cdeb39ff8","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.458960Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.458960Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Gil Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz, Reshef Meir","submitted_at":"2013-11-04T22:03:16Z","abstract_excerpt":"Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \\emph{bidding games}, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect equilibria (PSPE). In particular, we show that PSPEs form a semilattice, with a unique and natural \\emph{Bottom Equilibrium}.\n  Our main result shows that if only two actions available to the players in each node, then the Bottom Equilibrium has additional properties: (a) utilities are monotone in budget; (b) every outcome is Pareto-"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1311.0913","kind":"arxiv","version":5},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1311.0913","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.459052+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1311.0913v5","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.459052+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1311.0913","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.459052+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"I4NZE6OKL5AZ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:46.883200+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBC","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:46.883200+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"I4NZE6OK","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:46.883200+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ","json":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/I4NZE6OK"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/I4NZE6OK","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1311.0913&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/I4NZE6OKL5AZFWBCGVUXTHBTJJ/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.459052+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:08:27.459052+00:00"}