{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2026:I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD","short_pith_number":"pith:I5YSCAHL","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2601.18682","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T16:58:02Z","cross_cats_sorted":["nlin.AO"],"title_canon_sha256":"e7a2d5261a9bf26915f5311468c5b33688fc574a133ff43214e6d67ec44c80e3","abstract_canon_sha256":"a8b1b6ca1d67836f97202b2e67f15a601d910df2a0b45988cc71a7da959d4794"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"47712100eb51adbb5488965ef47e38c8ccd30b2a1885c7c786e1bcc7a0c8b76c","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2601.18682","version":1},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2601.18682","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2601.18682v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2601.18682","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"I5YSCAHLKGW3","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEI","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"I5YSCAHL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2026:I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2601.18682","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T16:58:02Z","cross_cats_sorted":["nlin.AO"],"title_canon_sha256":"e7a2d5261a9bf26915f5311468c5b33688fc574a133ff43214e6d67ec44c80e3","abstract_canon_sha256":"a8b1b6ca1d67836f97202b2e67f15a601d910df2a0b45988cc71a7da959d4794"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"47712100eb51adbb5488965ef47e38c8ccd30b2a1885c7c786e1bcc7a0c8b76c","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05.866946Z","signature_b64":"oBudRSlDiSDsF3LuzW7zid1DRnJ45+q0//JwJocm6kZE5uauFyEF1DcVO+55pJkTn3e7PKI0h9wwaCR+JwlmCw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"47712100eb51adbb5488965ef47e38c8ccd30b2a1885c7c786e1bcc7a0c8b76c","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05.866185Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05.866185Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"2601.18682","source_version":1,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"UzA4f08bF3FPgWX8kNaEI7qnEyTHlslETYizUYl9QPGfB1zXWDPYu4y6ThuIKjKLRNOVBlxkz1L4WxsJCPeoCQ==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-26T02:40:23.248061Z"},"content_sha256":"402fa555db115f250987ae7881fc0ff04f86fde087e700bf7321ef614541a300","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:402fa555db115f250987ae7881fc0ff04f86fde087e700bf7321ef614541a300"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2026:I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Competitive Social Mobilization in Threshold Models of Collective Action","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"The stability of participation thresholds determines whether competing social movements end in one dominant consensus or complete fragmentation.","cross_cats":["nlin.AO"],"primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","authors_text":"Bianca Y. S. Ishikawa, Jos\\'e F. Fontanari","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T16:58:02Z","abstract_excerpt":"Social mobilization often fails not for a lack of collective interest, but because of fierce competition between rival movements for the same limited pool of participants. We generalize the classic threshold model of collective behavior to analyze this competitive aggregation, exploring how populations with diverse participation thresholds navigate multiple, mutually exclusive causes. Focusing on the conditions necessary for a single consensus movement to encompass an entire population, our analysis reveals that the outcome of social competition depends critically on the stability of individua"},"claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"kind":"strongest_claim","text":"the outcome of social competition depends critically on the stability of individual dispositions. In quenched environments where participation thresholds are fixed, increasing resistance initially allows a dominant movement to suppress its competitors; however, further resistance triggers a sudden collapse into total fragmentation... Conversely, in annealed environments where opinions are fluid, higher resistance paradoxically drives a winner-takes-all consensus.","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C1","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"weakest_assumption","text":"The model assumes movements are strictly mutually exclusive and that participation decisions follow simple threshold rules without overlapping interests or external influences, which may not hold in complex real-world settings.","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C2","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"one_line_summary","text":"In competitive threshold models, fixed thresholds lead to fragmentation at high resistance while fluid thresholds produce winner-takes-all consensus, with discontinuous transitions in both cases.","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C3","attestation":"unclaimed"},{"kind":"headline","text":"The stability of participation thresholds determines whether competing social movements end in one dominant consensus or complete fragmentation.","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","claim_id":"C4","attestation":"unclaimed"}],"snapshot_sha256":"f45a49e1e64b54371fd2329821b6ab4fa0711964f0de1e3d3b28442975a1f698"},"source":{"id":"2601.18682","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":"96763579-9792-4fdb-adc4-b84b8d02f419","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"created_at":"2026-05-16T10:49:15.701699Z","strongest_claim":"the outcome of social competition depends critically on the stability of individual dispositions. In quenched environments where participation thresholds are fixed, increasing resistance initially allows a dominant movement to suppress its competitors; however, further resistance triggers a sudden collapse into total fragmentation... Conversely, in annealed environments where opinions are fluid, higher resistance paradoxically drives a winner-takes-all consensus.","one_line_summary":"In competitive threshold models, fixed thresholds lead to fragmentation at high resistance while fluid thresholds produce winner-takes-all consensus, with discontinuous transitions in both cases.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","weakest_assumption":"The model assumes movements are strictly mutually exclusive and that participation decisions follow simple threshold rules without overlapping interests or external influences, which may not hold in complex real-world settings.","pith_extraction_headline":"The stability of participation thresholds determines whether competing social movements end in one dominant consensus or complete fragmentation."},"references":{"count":25,"sample":[{"doi":"","year":1964,"title":"Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, Free Press Glen- coe, London, 1964","work_id":"4417536e-f08a-45e1-ae37-c8a98f3ef7e3","ref_index":1,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.1098/rstb.2015.0016","year":2015,"title":"Gavrilets, Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups, Philos","work_id":"e0e8637c-2d1f-4481-8e5b-c49242f7b9f6","ref_index":2,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.2307/2785927","year":1961,"title":"J.S. Coleman, J. James, The Equilibrium Size Distribu- tion of Freely-forming Groups, Sociometry 24 (1961) 36–45, https://doi.org/10.2307/2785927","work_id":"57129ec8-ffa2-436c-9cbe-f5364c0b629f","ref_index":3,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.2307/2785947","year":1962,"title":"White, Chance Models of Systems of Casual Groups, Sociometry 25 (1962) 153–172, https://doi.org/10.2307/2785947","work_id":"3f3296ba-2cda-44f3-8241-92e2ef1fbe52","ref_index":4,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false},{"doi":"10.3390/math11092152","year":2023,"title":"Fontanari, Stochastic Simulations of Casual Groups, Mathematics 11 (2023) 2152, https://doi.org/10.3390/math11092152","work_id":"2c8fbbd9-8413-428f-8b0a-e09735f8dc49","ref_index":5,"cited_arxiv_id":"","is_internal_anchor":false}],"resolved_work":25,"snapshot_sha256":"48eb3e4870963be1eb01a58ff2d5b9592bdd7473f95d9c8c26e7f958a8c1b378","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":"96763579-9792-4fdb-adc4-b84b8d02f419"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"3BOrYs1zJ5niTBnsD5zRE8qDi48nYJ7xNUihrIrgClsgSpLVIi6LUaCvesUrGeApu6ecCg4Ol082zMQYiVK1Bg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-26T02:40:23.249366Z"},"content_sha256":"527a6e15131c64eafdc14e166194879c537acdc4c73bfc36caba954a74559aae","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:527a6e15131c64eafdc14e166194879c537acdc4c73bfc36caba954a74559aae"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-05-26T02:40:23Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2026:I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEISZPPI7RYZD","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"a8b1b6ca1d67836f97202b2e67f15a601d910df2a0b45988cc71a7da959d4794","cross_cats_sorted":["nlin.AO"],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T16:58:02Z","title_canon_sha256":"e7a2d5261a9bf26915f5311468c5b33688fc574a133ff43214e6d67ec44c80e3"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2601.18682","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2601.18682","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2601.18682v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2601.18682","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"I5YSCAHLKGW3","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"I5YSCAHLKGW3WVEI","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"I5YSCAHL","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:33:37Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:527a6e15131c64eafdc14e166194879c537acdc4c73bfc36caba954a74559aae","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":4,"items":[{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C1","kind":"strongest_claim","source":"verdict.strongest_claim","status":"machine_extracted","text":"the outcome of social competition depends critically on the stability of individual dispositions. In quenched environments where participation thresholds are fixed, increasing resistance initially allows a dominant movement to suppress its competitors; however, further resistance triggers a sudden collapse into total fragmentation... Conversely, in annealed environments where opinions are fluid, higher resistance paradoxically drives a winner-takes-all consensus."},{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C2","kind":"weakest_assumption","source":"verdict.weakest_assumption","status":"machine_extracted","text":"The model assumes movements are strictly mutually exclusive and that participation decisions follow simple threshold rules without overlapping interests or external influences, which may not hold in complex real-world settings."},{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C3","kind":"one_line_summary","source":"verdict.one_line_summary","status":"machine_extracted","text":"In competitive threshold models, fixed thresholds lead to fragmentation at high resistance while fluid thresholds produce winner-takes-all consensus, with discontinuous transitions in both cases."},{"attestation":"unclaimed","claim_id":"C4","kind":"headline","source":"verdict.pith_extraction.headline","status":"machine_extracted","text":"The stability of participation thresholds determines whether competing social movements end in one dominant consensus or complete fragmentation."}],"snapshot_sha256":"f45a49e1e64b54371fd2329821b6ab4fa0711964f0de1e3d3b28442975a1f698"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"Social mobilization often fails not for a lack of collective interest, but because of fierce competition between rival movements for the same limited pool of participants. We generalize the classic threshold model of collective behavior to analyze this competitive aggregation, exploring how populations with diverse participation thresholds navigate multiple, mutually exclusive causes. Focusing on the conditions necessary for a single consensus movement to encompass an entire population, our analysis reveals that the outcome of social competition depends critically on the stability of individua","authors_text":"Bianca Y. S. Ishikawa, Jos\\'e F. Fontanari","cross_cats":["nlin.AO"],"headline":"The stability of participation thresholds determines whether competing social movements end in one dominant consensus or complete fragmentation.","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T16:58:02Z","title":"Competitive Social Mobilization in Threshold Models of Collective Action"},"references":{"count":25,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":25,"sample":[{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":1,"title":"Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, Free Press Glen- coe, London, 1964","work_id":"4417536e-f08a-45e1-ae37-c8a98f3ef7e3","year":1964},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"10.1098/rstb.2015.0016","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":2,"title":"Gavrilets, Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups, Philos","work_id":"e0e8637c-2d1f-4481-8e5b-c49242f7b9f6","year":2015},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"10.2307/2785927","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":3,"title":"J.S. Coleman, J. James, The Equilibrium Size Distribu- tion of Freely-forming Groups, Sociometry 24 (1961) 36–45, https://doi.org/10.2307/2785927","work_id":"57129ec8-ffa2-436c-9cbe-f5364c0b629f","year":1961},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"10.2307/2785947","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":4,"title":"White, Chance Models of Systems of Casual Groups, Sociometry 25 (1962) 153–172, https://doi.org/10.2307/2785947","work_id":"3f3296ba-2cda-44f3-8241-92e2ef1fbe52","year":1962},{"cited_arxiv_id":"","doi":"10.3390/math11092152","is_internal_anchor":false,"ref_index":5,"title":"Fontanari, Stochastic Simulations of Casual Groups, Mathematics 11 (2023) 2152, https://doi.org/10.3390/math11092152","work_id":"2c8fbbd9-8413-428f-8b0a-e09735f8dc49","year":2023}],"snapshot_sha256":"48eb3e4870963be1eb01a58ff2d5b9592bdd7473f95d9c8c26e7f958a8c1b378"},"source":{"id":"2601.18682","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"created_at":"2026-05-16T10:49:15.701699Z","id":"96763579-9792-4fdb-adc4-b84b8d02f419","model_set":{"reader":"grok-4.3"},"one_line_summary":"In competitive threshold models, fixed thresholds lead to fragmentation at high resistance while fluid thresholds produce winner-takes-all consensus, with discontinuous transitions in both cases.","pipeline_version":"pith-pipeline@v0.9.0","pith_extraction_headline":"The stability of participation thresholds determines whether competing social movements end in one dominant consensus or complete fragmentation.","strongest_claim":"the outcome of social competition depends critically on the stability of individual dispositions. In quenched environments where participation thresholds are fixed, increasing resistance initially allows a dominant movement to suppress its competitors; however, further resistance triggers a sudden collapse into total fragmentation... Conversely, in annealed environments where opinions are fluid, higher resistance paradoxically drives a winner-takes-all consensus.","weakest_assumption":"The model assumes movements are strictly mutually exclusive and that participation decisions follow simple threshold rules without overlapping interests or external influences, which may not hold in complex real-world settings."}},"verdict_id":"96763579-9792-4fdb-adc4-b84b8d02f419"}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:402fa555db115f250987ae7881fc0ff04f86fde087e700bf7321ef614541a300","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"a8b1b6ca1d67836f97202b2e67f15a601d910df2a0b45988cc71a7da959d4794","cross_cats_sorted":["nlin.AO"],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","submitted_at":"2026-01-26T16:58:02Z","title_canon_sha256":"e7a2d5261a9bf26915f5311468c5b33688fc574a133ff43214e6d67ec44c80e3"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2601.18682","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"47712100eb51adbb5488965ef47e38c8ccd30b2a1885c7c786e1bcc7a0c8b76c","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"47712100eb51adbb5488965ef47e38c8ccd30b2a1885c7c786e1bcc7a0c8b76c","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05.866185Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05.866185Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"oBudRSlDiSDsF3LuzW7zid1DRnJ45+q0//JwJocm6kZE5uauFyEF1DcVO+55pJkTn3e7PKI0h9wwaCR+JwlmCw==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:45:05.866946Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"2601.18682","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:402fa555db115f250987ae7881fc0ff04f86fde087e700bf7321ef614541a300","sha256:527a6e15131c64eafdc14e166194879c537acdc4c73bfc36caba954a74559aae"],"state_sha256":"f45acd1bc7a76816426040f124b4abcd29641525a1bdc9dada76561a4fa765cd"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"pnrZ4pm+CHSqwPYmeIS1vJ9XnOwIBBUTn5ttBkoep8O/46k8AG3zmTvDuo/0EZrFeSsf02uzhTZCvlejx/FfAg==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-26T02:40:23.254677Z","bundle_sha256":"9adee5c2b7c6dc2a5ac6a2be55c225592abe10f9931a488871260c3c12f34294"}}