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It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal revenue is infinite, but the best \"simple\" mechanism achieves revenue at most one ([Briest et. al 15], [Hart and Nisan 13]), even when $m=2$. This result has long served as a cautionary tale discouraging the study of multi-item auctions without some notion of \"independent items\".\n  In this work we initiate a smoothed analysis of such multi-item auction settings. 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