{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2014:JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6","short_pith_number":"pith:JE4RBTHE","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1407.2420","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"math.PR","submitted_at":"2014-07-09T10:19:06Z","cross_cats_sorted":["q-fin.PR"],"title_canon_sha256":"89861125a00ffca19676aabc63f5a36ae4f4cf3858487dc96c34bf3a778c6a52","abstract_canon_sha256":"87f2fd4b7ecdc73ae2f512075208819e3b6d312007e453ec504e8a9694b3cc9b"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"493910cce48e313e61d16392df5cc01fadf681a053286c3e67d556d3d89b04e9","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1407.2420","version":3},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1407.2420","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1407.2420v3","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1407.2420","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"JE4RBTHERYYT","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:33Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"JE4RBTHERYYT4YOR","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:33Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"JE4RBTHE","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:33Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2014:JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1407.2420","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"math.PR","submitted_at":"2014-07-09T10:19:06Z","cross_cats_sorted":["q-fin.PR"],"title_canon_sha256":"89861125a00ffca19676aabc63f5a36ae4f4cf3858487dc96c34bf3a778c6a52","abstract_canon_sha256":"87f2fd4b7ecdc73ae2f512075208819e3b6d312007e453ec504e8a9694b3cc9b"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"493910cce48e313e61d16392df5cc01fadf681a053286c3e67d556d3d89b04e9","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24.783996Z","signature_b64":"tTLs/1qN64urYj5n7lnQe6e5KvZ0Ehbw1cqNa9V+nnikH8MvLW4omCjIkLy9zzB3PWEgP8BewmBe6LvnpOE8BA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"493910cce48e313e61d16392df5cc01fadf681a053286c3e67d556d3d89b04e9","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24.783641Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24.783641Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"1407.2420","source_version":3,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"Liu8lYToOwEpYm0yUOLnw75PsDUGlPZXGc7Z4KyNzXO/UD05y7MDXX5bLk8afWl10K7owYEpbj6sbH47zK7FCg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-06-22T08:24:32.699116Z"},"content_sha256":"6da178057b9493b9aa44b973af70c99e5a06816e602b3684830d30aaa29fba72","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:6da178057b9493b9aa44b973af70c99e5a06816e602b3684830d30aaa29fba72"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2014:JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Markovian Nash equilibrium in financial markets with asymmetric information and related forward-backward systems","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["q-fin.PR"],"primary_cat":"math.PR","authors_text":"Albina Danilova, Umut \\c{C}etin","submitted_at":"2014-07-09T10:19:06Z","abstract_excerpt":"This paper develops a new methodology for studying continuous-time Nash equilibrium in a financial market with asymmetrically informed agents. This approach allows us to lift the restriction of risk neutrality imposed on market makers by the current literature. It turns out that, when the market makers are risk averse, the optimal strategies of the agents are solutions of a forward-backward system of partial and stochastic differential equations. In particular, the price set by the market makers solves a nonstandard \"quadratic\" backward stochastic differential equation. The main result of the "},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1407.2420","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"8ajNOn38TUfRxLeltcDtBHLZAGvVxL5nWJuQnfkyrw1lGzFND6/tL3MscsRZrE2h0OePFCkQsdwfa6O4zFHBDw==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-06-22T08:24:32.699482Z"},"content_sha256":"252a1d3c3a577d1d265b6b047bcca69aca23f24b78b06534a90583dad8f1b97c","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:252a1d3c3a577d1d265b6b047bcca69aca23f24b78b06534a90583dad8f1b97c"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-06-22T08:24:32Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2014:JE4RBTHERYYT4YORMOJN6XGAD6","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"87f2fd4b7ecdc73ae2f512075208819e3b6d312007e453ec504e8a9694b3cc9b","cross_cats_sorted":["q-fin.PR"],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"math.PR","submitted_at":"2014-07-09T10:19:06Z","title_canon_sha256":"89861125a00ffca19676aabc63f5a36ae4f4cf3858487dc96c34bf3a778c6a52"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1407.2420","kind":"arxiv","version":3}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1407.2420","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1407.2420v3","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1407.2420","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"JE4RBTHERYYT","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:33Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"JE4RBTHERYYT4YOR","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:33Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"JE4RBTHE","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:33Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:252a1d3c3a577d1d265b6b047bcca69aca23f24b78b06534a90583dad8f1b97c","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"This paper develops a new methodology for studying continuous-time Nash equilibrium in a financial market with asymmetrically informed agents. This approach allows us to lift the restriction of risk neutrality imposed on market makers by the current literature. It turns out that, when the market makers are risk averse, the optimal strategies of the agents are solutions of a forward-backward system of partial and stochastic differential equations. In particular, the price set by the market makers solves a nonstandard \"quadratic\" backward stochastic differential equation. The main result of the ","authors_text":"Albina Danilova, Umut \\c{C}etin","cross_cats":["q-fin.PR"],"headline":"","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"math.PR","submitted_at":"2014-07-09T10:19:06Z","title":"Markovian Nash equilibrium in financial markets with asymmetric information and related forward-backward systems"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1407.2420","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:6da178057b9493b9aa44b973af70c99e5a06816e602b3684830d30aaa29fba72","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"87f2fd4b7ecdc73ae2f512075208819e3b6d312007e453ec504e8a9694b3cc9b","cross_cats_sorted":["q-fin.PR"],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"math.PR","submitted_at":"2014-07-09T10:19:06Z","title_canon_sha256":"89861125a00ffca19676aabc63f5a36ae4f4cf3858487dc96c34bf3a778c6a52"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1407.2420","kind":"arxiv","version":3}},"canonical_sha256":"493910cce48e313e61d16392df5cc01fadf681a053286c3e67d556d3d89b04e9","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"493910cce48e313e61d16392df5cc01fadf681a053286c3e67d556d3d89b04e9","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24.783641Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24.783641Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"tTLs/1qN64urYj5n7lnQe6e5KvZ0Ehbw1cqNa9V+nnikH8MvLW4omCjIkLy9zzB3PWEgP8BewmBe6LvnpOE8BA==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:06:24.783996Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"1407.2420","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":3}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:6da178057b9493b9aa44b973af70c99e5a06816e602b3684830d30aaa29fba72","sha256:252a1d3c3a577d1d265b6b047bcca69aca23f24b78b06534a90583dad8f1b97c"],"state_sha256":"394c95306efaefa51d6afaa8f908aa3254bd7227bb40a4e13392e9f09346caa6"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"JICD81wAN4JbG6aYgyCKqbpJGSHRr41ejmhVrMvb8tD++bUG5GkdDPlucf9cYmMCrq5c9WjNMOg8PeTFTb+vBg==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-06-22T08:24:32.701491Z","bundle_sha256":"fb8a64d204e74cbdb7a512b2df88c6d9f43f324803a03bc78e0a3f8033c567d4"}}