{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2019:KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL","short_pith_number":"pith:KKYGD2VE","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"52b061eaa4b3813ca5b3e57d9f466b72f78d5d242aaba30e5f4c48681b5fbcbb","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1911.11747","version":3},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["econ.TH"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dominik Peters, Piotr Skowron","submitted_at":"2019-11-26T18:31:41Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragm\\'en and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an arbitrary number of candidates. Previous work has proposed proportionality axioms satisfied by Thiele's rule (now known as Proportional Approval Voting, PAV) but not by Phragm\\'en's rule. By proposing two new proportionality axioms (laminar proportionality and priceability) satisfied by Phragm\\'en but not Thiele, we show that the two rules achieve two distinct form"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1911.11747","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2019-11-26T18:31:41Z","cross_cats_sorted":["econ.TH"],"title_canon_sha256":"33ced2590eb77ee4b390bf32853832a29c79d06d70a7c424791660d58f0635a0","abstract_canon_sha256":"5e6ccfa925919bb09579d71ada2757fe905937b6bcc55bf8d20bc2527481b143"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.277367Z","signature_b64":"u6dNmb7zyyDImyznjLyQS6oJDc6SIewpvq5QMGyaZFKVdoTTHkG525oz3X4plaXQez+gHK9xyKvNKbDrZFatCg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"52b061eaa4b3813ca5b3e57d9f466b72f78d5d242aaba30e5f4c48681b5fbcbb","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276880Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276880Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["econ.TH"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dominik Peters, Piotr Skowron","submitted_at":"2019-11-26T18:31:41Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragm\\'en and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an arbitrary number of candidates. Previous work has proposed proportionality axioms satisfied by Thiele's rule (now known as Proportional Approval Voting, PAV) but not by Phragm\\'en's rule. By proposing two new proportionality axioms (laminar proportionality and priceability) satisfied by Phragm\\'en but not Thiele, we show that the two rules achieve two distinct form"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1911.11747","kind":"arxiv","version":3},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/1911.11747/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1911.11747","created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1911.11747v3","created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1911.11747","created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"KKYGD2VEWOAT","created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT","created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"KKYGD2VE","created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":2,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2606.19968","citing_title":"Beyond Lower Quota: Avoiding Overrepresentation in Multi-Winner Voting","ref_index":16,"is_internal_anchor":false},{"citing_arxiv_id":"2605.06194","citing_title":"Core Existence in Approval-Based Committee Elections with up to Seven Voter Types","ref_index":4,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL","json":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/KKYGD2VE"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/KKYGD2VE","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1911.11747&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/KKYGD2VEWOATZJNT4V6Z6RTLOL/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T05:11:33.276937+00:00"}