{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2019:LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2","short_pith_number":"pith:LONDPOZH","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"5b9a37bb27a8471395238ea0205eaf16aba8ae2f50a24e41d8d94a8bc72f89ad","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1910.03883","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Second-order coding rates for key distillation in quantum key distribution","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.IT","math-ph","math.IT","math.MP"],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"Eneet Kaur, Mark M. Wilde, Saikat Guha, Sumeet Khatri","submitted_at":"2019-10-09T10:24:44Z","abstract_excerpt":"The security of quantum key distribution has traditionally been analyzed in either the asymptotic or non-asymptotic regimes. In this paper, we provide a bridge between these two regimes, by determining second-order coding rates for key distillation in quantum key distribution under collective attacks. Our main result is a formula that characterizes the backoff from the known asymptotic formula for key distillation -- our formula incorporates the reliability and security of the protocol, as well as the mutual information variances to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. In order to det"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1910.03883","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2019-10-09T10:24:44Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.IT","math-ph","math.IT","math.MP"],"title_canon_sha256":"7992aa4a5f9db2bfc475c43c98a9f1910a9fe9ee477878c58f3987b4736b4680","abstract_canon_sha256":"f54aec1a82b8e1acd0307549f707245a0190750d3c41801abbdeb4bc865a1fff"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.605291Z","signature_b64":"gPOuGhawTVVh32YhUj8uEDCJ6vnGwYeb87v0abKgvB+79Nf1h4fG85inJ2Qz6Sh1p+Rek2r3dEJ3us5liJn2DA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"5b9a37bb27a8471395238ea0205eaf16aba8ae2f50a24e41d8d94a8bc72f89ad","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604893Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604893Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Second-order coding rates for key distillation in quantum key distribution","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.IT","math-ph","math.IT","math.MP"],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"Eneet Kaur, Mark M. Wilde, Saikat Guha, Sumeet Khatri","submitted_at":"2019-10-09T10:24:44Z","abstract_excerpt":"The security of quantum key distribution has traditionally been analyzed in either the asymptotic or non-asymptotic regimes. In this paper, we provide a bridge between these two regimes, by determining second-order coding rates for key distillation in quantum key distribution under collective attacks. Our main result is a formula that characterizes the backoff from the known asymptotic formula for key distillation -- our formula incorporates the reliability and security of the protocol, as well as the mutual information variances to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. In order to det"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1910.03883","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/1910.03883/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1910.03883","created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1910.03883v2","created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1910.03883","created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"LONDPOZHVBDR","created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"LONDPOZHVBDRHFJD","created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"LONDPOZH","created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2502.05524","citing_title":"Achievable rates in non-asymptotic bosonic quantum communication","ref_index":48,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2","json":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/LONDPOZH"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/LONDPOZH","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1910.03883&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/LONDPOZHVBDRHFJDR2QCAXVPC2/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T03:00:26.604950+00:00"}