{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2017:LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX","short_pith_number":"pith:LQWT2MZJ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"5c2d3d332925fe55c71def43aa208e75d0b3fd6dcc8a056c78a7a945f0ed3aef","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1712.08519","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"The Heisenberg Defense: Proactively Defending SGX Enclaves against Page-Table-Based Side-Channel Attacks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Frank Piessens, Raoul Strackx","submitted_at":"2017-12-22T15:32:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX -- the only publicly available high-end PMA -- has been shown to only provide limited isolation. An attacker controlling the untrusted page tables, can learn enclave secrets by observing its page access patterns.\n  Fortifying existing protected-module architectures in a real-world setting against side-channel attacks is an extremely difficult task as system software (hypervisor, operating system, ...) needs to remain in full control over"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1712.08519","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.CR","submitted_at":"2017-12-22T15:32:29Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"7537dc21d6a83b948a3c29a064c65790ea5449cc2243ff63ae2aa256f016627c","abstract_canon_sha256":"163aaeadd8b5f01ecab3ae4c6aad976380fcc38ee543062216ed1d6d2a4bfff2"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.171199Z","signature_b64":"KCr9IkiwlQSXuBLtYhRAWiEpkVgDXvd0HsPxCOCL0/0rlHsDhH1sQMWmBgWGRrsRRrFlKcAr7rmNVL82NAdmAg==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"5c2d3d332925fe55c71def43aa208e75d0b3fd6dcc8a056c78a7a945f0ed3aef","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170640Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170640Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"The Heisenberg Defense: Proactively Defending SGX Enclaves against Page-Table-Based Side-Channel Attacks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.CR","authors_text":"Frank Piessens, Raoul Strackx","submitted_at":"2017-12-22T15:32:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX -- the only publicly available high-end PMA -- has been shown to only provide limited isolation. An attacker controlling the untrusted page tables, can learn enclave secrets by observing its page access patterns.\n  Fortifying existing protected-module architectures in a real-world setting against side-channel attacks is an extremely difficult task as system software (hypervisor, operating system, ...) needs to remain in full control over"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1712.08519","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1712.08519","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170718+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1712.08519v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170718+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1712.08519","created_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170718+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"LQWT2MZJEX7F","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:31:28.150371+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY5","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:31:28.150371+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"LQWT2MZJ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:31:28.150371+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2604.20401","citing_title":"Onyx: Cost-Efficient Disk-Oblivious ANN Search","ref_index":114,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX","json":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/LQWT2MZJ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/LQWT2MZJ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1712.08519&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/LQWT2MZJEX7FLRY555B2UIEOOX/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170718+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T00:27:23.170718+00:00"}