{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2022:M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G","short_pith_number":"pith:M2JBEE6Z","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"66921213d9e9b659874b564f2ef284e1bc73903d30af0d37fa80417ea0530113","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2203.09971","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"George Christodoulou, Ioannis Caragiannis, Nicos Protopapas","submitted_at":"2022-03-18T14:04:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straight-forward rule that divides the budget proportionally is susceptible to manipulation. In a recent work, Freeman et al. [arXiv:1905.00457] proposed a class of truthful mechanisms, called moving phantom mechanisms. Among others, they propose a proportional mechanism, in the sense that in the extreme case where all agents prefer a single project to receive the whole amount, the budget i"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2203.09971","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2022-03-18T14:04:29Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"b13f599a2be3e58b1e096e45955ea91c92b24207cbd6cf6d262fa81dc225b1c8","abstract_canon_sha256":"932e6266064049698f3ffd849567e0711dc80ce4e2a9bb5b7ff9e9730d8afb2c"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200833Z","signature_b64":"qx6YZgUpwkBObnP21RmNht8GChEv/TRDNwwiJ+7/o5TvFaIsDX8vypVeqTQCbEofLJKBoN8E07Cg4NeEi9y9Cw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"66921213d9e9b659874b564f2ef284e1bc73903d30af0d37fa80417ea0530113","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200406Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200406Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"George Christodoulou, Ioannis Caragiannis, Nicos Protopapas","submitted_at":"2022-03-18T14:04:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straight-forward rule that divides the budget proportionally is susceptible to manipulation. In a recent work, Freeman et al. [arXiv:1905.00457] proposed a class of truthful mechanisms, called moving phantom mechanisms. Among others, they propose a proportional mechanism, in the sense that in the extreme case where all agents prefer a single project to receive the whole amount, the budget i"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2203.09971","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2203.09971/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2203.09971","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2203.09971v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2203.09971","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"M2JBEE6Z5G3F","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2L","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"M2JBEE6Z","created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2510.24872","citing_title":"What Are People's Actual Utility Functions in Budget Aggregation?","ref_index":4,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G","json":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/M2JBEE6Z"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/M2JBEE6Z","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2203.09971&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/M2JBEE6Z5G3FTB2LKZHS54UE4G/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T04:06:26.200470+00:00"}