{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2002:O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2","short_pith_number":"pith:O6UCFB3J","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"77a82287691c367cc1637eba7d6cc23e976007870c55d180e2ef4c100e302127","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"quant-ph/0211153","version":5},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"W.-Y. Hwang","submitted_at":"2002-11-24T07:33:47Z","abstract_excerpt":"We propose a decoy-state method to overcome the photon-number-splitting attack for Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol in the presence of high loss: A legitimate user intentionally and randomly replaces signal pulses by multi-photon pulses (decoy-states). Then they check the loss of the decoy-states. If the loss of the decoy-states is abnormally less than that of signal pulses, the whole protocol is aborted. Otherwise, to continue the protocol, they estimate loss of signal multi-photon pulses based on that of decoy-states. This estimation can be done with an assumption that"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"quant-ph/0211153","kind":"arxiv","version":5},"metadata":{"license":"","primary_cat":"quant-ph","submitted_at":"2002-11-24T07:33:47Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"b6ade1d48527e6b434cf047c0921685bfdd37a4900c0ca9e6dc7b9f9e6af4e81","abstract_canon_sha256":"89b2062aab1607ca3c7f956aa881ddf56b6b13e92c584a430eeba4b5ec64e70e"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379913Z","signature_b64":"eisJyQ+c8n3w4EfFaQcCkmMdaf6Fc3zIKvnvrhiivsQietoldEKEZLfRh+qPd/horrsQfgcPGVrkPo95BVLOBw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"77a82287691c367cc1637eba7d6cc23e976007870c55d180e2ef4c100e302127","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379557Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379557Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Quantum Key Distribution with High Loss: Toward Global Secure Communication","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"quant-ph","authors_text":"W.-Y. Hwang","submitted_at":"2002-11-24T07:33:47Z","abstract_excerpt":"We propose a decoy-state method to overcome the photon-number-splitting attack for Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol in the presence of high loss: A legitimate user intentionally and randomly replaces signal pulses by multi-photon pulses (decoy-states). Then they check the loss of the decoy-states. If the loss of the decoy-states is abnormally less than that of signal pulses, the whole protocol is aborted. Otherwise, to continue the protocol, they estimate loss of signal multi-photon pulses based on that of decoy-states. This estimation can be done with an assumption that"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"quant-ph/0211153","kind":"arxiv","version":5},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/quant-ph/0211153/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"quant-ph/0211153","created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"quant-ph/0211153v5","created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0211153","created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"O6UCFB3JDQ3H","created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLD","created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"O6UCFB3J","created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2505.17502","citing_title":"Demonstration of Quantum-Secure Communications in a Nuclear Reactor","ref_index":45,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2","json":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/O6UCFB3J"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/O6UCFB3J","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=quant-ph/0211153&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/O6UCFB3JDQ3HZQLDP25H23GCH2/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-04T16:36:13.379620+00:00"}