{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2003:OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ","short_pith_number":"pith:OGED5GRS","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"71883e9a32041d82b734389dabbca132477804fe3c9510a7636df5f6a8a7041f","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"cs/0310039","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Divyakant Agrawal, Subhash Suri","submitted_at":"2003-10-17T20:56:10Z","abstract_excerpt":"Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance."},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"cs/0310039","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2003-10-17T20:56:10Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"88908c01c1d5669864a125881484b0c231d1fa94c41bb8bc2d74374df1f2cc78","abstract_canon_sha256":"837695037356391f91513a7594cd4d6458a4d530d12293c1c3d2708deadff4f5"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002680Z","signature_b64":"mHjXErIhcRdhG9sIxqYDrwgp4udlbLHR3QJkYDByV7zQ/im3dgOYW89T0Yd85S+DMD3WXuTUKQHOGH0amYliAA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"71883e9a32041d82b734389dabbca132477804fe3c9510a7636df5f6a8a7041f","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002280Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002280Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems","license":"","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Divyakant Agrawal, Subhash Suri","submitted_at":"2003-10-17T20:56:10Z","abstract_excerpt":"Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance."},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"cs/0310039","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/cs/0310039/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"cs/0310039","created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"cs/0310039v1","created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.cs/0310039","created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"OGED5GRSAQOY","created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"OGED5GRSAQOYFNZU","created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"OGED5GRS","created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ","json":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/OGED5GRS"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/OGED5GRS","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=cs/0310039&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/OGED5GRSAQOYFNZUHCO2XPFBGJ/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-04T14:24:38.002340+00:00"}