{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV","short_pith_number":"pith:QXZFFWRZ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"85f252da39ddb54e7c1b5509cbb5c805614713746112c812e776cb032e5c7aee","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1509.01727","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"On repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information and asymptotically bounded values","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.OC"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Fedor Sandomirskiy","submitted_at":"2015-09-05T18:39:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the order of $N$ or $\\sqrt{N}$ as $N\\to \\infty$.\n  Our aim is to find what is causing another type of asymptotic behavior of the value $V_N$ observed for the discrete version of the financial market model introduced by De Meyer and Saley. For this game Domansky and independently De Meyer with Marino found that $V_N$ remains bounded as $N\\to\\infty$ and converges to t"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1509.01727","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2015-09-05T18:39:04Z","cross_cats_sorted":["math.OC"],"title_canon_sha256":"db8437a1642819895c8e4a0d0f7398bdb8a1a7b88c8abf1a6b1ecd59f5828de6","abstract_canon_sha256":"f920e63f5dab71474616a958fd8ae9efd3831409096e91639e724dcdae1e805f"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.603142Z","signature_b64":"hTLQ66oSjd1jVXgu0oRUHzCPF3bJZLKqI/WnEkn8qf4dL0bjaPccmJ7LBY7MIYDdW6OB9tNmX4epQaZlGnJfBA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"85f252da39ddb54e7c1b5509cbb5c805614713746112c812e776cb032e5c7aee","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602467Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602467Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"On repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information and asymptotically bounded values","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["math.OC"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Fedor Sandomirskiy","submitted_at":"2015-09-05T18:39:04Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the order of $N$ or $\\sqrt{N}$ as $N\\to \\infty$.\n  Our aim is to find what is causing another type of asymptotic behavior of the value $V_N$ observed for the discrete version of the financial market model introduced by De Meyer and Saley. For this game Domansky and independently De Meyer with Marino found that $V_N$ remains bounded as $N\\to\\infty$ and converges to t"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1509.01727","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1509.01727","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602577+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1509.01727v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602577+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1509.01727","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602577+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"QXZFFWRZ3W2U","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:39.896362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:39.896362+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"QXZFFWRZ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:39.896362+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV","json":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/QXZFFWRZ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/QXZFFWRZ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1509.01727&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/QXZFFWRZ3W2U47A3KUE4XNOIAV/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602577+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T01:04:46.602577+00:00"}