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On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in biological and social networks [M.~E.~J. Newman, Nat. Phys. \\textbf{8}, 25 (2012)]. Motivated by these facts, we here consider the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game taking place on top of a real social network to investigate how the community structure and the heterogeneity in activity of individuals affect the evolution of cooperation. 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