{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2012:S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7","short_pith_number":"pith:S6WX7E7V","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"97ad7f93f5593cefe5806bb9f3ed52c7f1b2fe93e3a2e09df7cab391e6fc5eab","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1211.4053","version":2},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Spectrum Access through Threats in Cognitive Radio Networks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.NI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Eylem Ekici, Karim Khalil","submitted_at":"2012-11-16T22:25:25Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider multiple access games in which primary users are interested in maximizing their confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and secondary users employ eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize their data rate to a common destination at minimum transmission energy. For the non-cooperative static game, Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies are derived and shown to be Pareto inefficient in general, when channel gains are common knowledge. For the two-player Stackelberg game where the primary user is the leader, it is shown that the secondary user is forced t"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1211.4053","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2012-11-16T22:25:25Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.NI"],"title_canon_sha256":"604edd919f3b318aa31cddb6cb754a315940ad36d9b89f4f1cdf23d9b3a53c39","abstract_canon_sha256":"dec161af051db20afa4f853ea7d888e3dedb00b26f63399c5fc896a9dfe26727"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408801Z","signature_b64":"W4Sf3z9drxr7tXwmLTF2OJPzFd2ksnOFRqM+lWou+NFtAAOlitjpt6BR5br7Gxe+utZDQy23AepH9dLSYf9fCQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"97ad7f93f5593cefe5806bb9f3ed52c7f1b2fe93e3a2e09df7cab391e6fc5eab","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408055Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408055Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Spectrum Access through Threats in Cognitive Radio Networks","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.NI"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Eylem Ekici, Karim Khalil","submitted_at":"2012-11-16T22:25:25Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider multiple access games in which primary users are interested in maximizing their confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and secondary users employ eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize their data rate to a common destination at minimum transmission energy. For the non-cooperative static game, Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies are derived and shown to be Pareto inefficient in general, when channel gains are common knowledge. For the two-player Stackelberg game where the primary user is the leader, it is shown that the secondary user is forced t"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1211.4053","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1211.4053","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408169+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1211.4053v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408169+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1211.4053","created_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408169+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"S6WX7E7VLE6O","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:20.899486+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMA","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:20.899486+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"S6WX7E7V","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:27:20.899486+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7","json":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/S6WX7E7V"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/S6WX7E7V","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1211.4053&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/S6WX7E7VLE6O7ZMANO47H3KSY7/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408169+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T03:20:48.408169+00:00"}