{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2024:SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5","short_pith_number":"pith:SOWLQHD4","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"93acb81c7c1bbc6b34e3a7804e7337bf50cfaf5f82044687699ed23dfb67b616","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2412.19192","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Game-Theoretically Secure Distributed Protocols for Fair Allocation in Coalitional Games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.CR"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Qipeng Kuang, Quan Xue, T-H. Hubert Chan","submitted_at":"2024-12-26T12:13:21Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it is a challenge to design efficient distributed protocols among mutually distrusted players when there is no central authority to generate unbiased randomness. The game-theoretic notion of maximin security has been proposed to offer guarantees to an honest player's reward even if all other players are susceptible to an adversary.\n  Permutation sampling is ofte"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2412.19192","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2024-12-26T12:13:21Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.CR"],"title_canon_sha256":"beb8cb2570b362d56c56d61e3910fb019db263ffa944bb393536a54b2ce6ff1b","abstract_canon_sha256":"76ae6465ef66e3735d287a23586708d5f31c69f72f29475c0445ae6ba7da5ca5"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094899Z","signature_b64":"jVd8n48afXOu3z1uSUmCBZYE2J5dfHEy89bvHe+f0qzOjOVNxJ6UAHusA3rWlV4Wc6kD1spQb2h6KQ3DyaZuBQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"93acb81c7c1bbc6b34e3a7804e7337bf50cfaf5f82044687699ed23dfb67b616","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094487Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094487Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Game-Theoretically Secure Distributed Protocols for Fair Allocation in Coalitional Games","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.CR"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Qipeng Kuang, Quan Xue, T-H. Hubert Chan","submitted_at":"2024-12-26T12:13:21Z","abstract_excerpt":"We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it is a challenge to design efficient distributed protocols among mutually distrusted players when there is no central authority to generate unbiased randomness. The game-theoretic notion of maximin security has been proposed to offer guarantees to an honest player's reward even if all other players are susceptible to an adversary.\n  Permutation sampling is ofte"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2412.19192","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2412.19192/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2412.19192","created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2412.19192v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2412.19192","created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"SOWLQHD4DO6G","created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHD","created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"SOWLQHD4","created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5","json":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/SOWLQHD4"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/SOWLQHD4","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2412.19192&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/SOWLQHD4DO6GWNHDU6AE44ZXX5/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T09:54:32.094543+00:00"}