{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2025:UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA","short_pith_number":"pith:UA3F57U2","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"a0365efe9a7f37f6188e43761d7b36683fffbe525e6395730a10687d6a21ba25","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2508.09741","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczy\\'nski, {\\L}ukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski","submitted_at":"2025-08-13T12:12:23Z","abstract_excerpt":"We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2508.09741","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2025-08-13T12:12:23Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"6f9e36549693a081f775599fccc2df6bac5f00f1149a8ac120ba51085b1b50a6","abstract_canon_sha256":"eb1c24e7be2b37f216e2b9a5244a5bf35b5756e8c686a0094b228c6cc3d6444d"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.007510Z","signature_b64":"Ib3+LVdN4lDk6ZwJLuNhJanMI+LdLrM/eewKtmjTQRFm4d1DTxodvfs9f+u1/exbGBs+bFzj8hQwrNhu8nHwAA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"a0365efe9a7f37f6188e43761d7b36683fffbe525e6395730a10687d6a21ba25","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006914Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006914Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczy\\'nski, {\\L}ukasz Janeczko, Piotr Faliszewski","submitted_at":"2025-08-13T12:12:23Z","abstract_excerpt":"We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer submits a subset of project proposals, aiming at maximizing the total cost of those that get funded. We focus on finding conditions under which pure Nash equilibria (NE) exist in our games, and on the complexity of checking whether they exist. We also seek algorithms for computing best responses for the proposers"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2508.09741","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2508.09741/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2508.09741","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2508.09741v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2508.09741","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"UA3F57U2P437","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"UA3F57U2P437MGEO","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"UA3F57U2","created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":2,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2606.11160","citing_title":"Fractional Pareto-Optimality in Multiwinner Voting","ref_index":20,"is_internal_anchor":false},{"citing_arxiv_id":"2605.22528","citing_title":"Multi-Winner Voting Games in TU and NTU: When is the Core Always Non-Empty?","ref_index":17,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA","json":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/UA3F57U2"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/UA3F57U2","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2508.09741&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/UA3F57U2P437MGEOIN3B26ZWNA/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T11:53:21.006973+00:00"}