{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2024:UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ","short_pith_number":"pith:UIPOD2EN","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"a21ee1e88d69e26ecf217e9bda60166c036c5663914131fdd9bdd492aa5855a2","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2406.03928","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Balancing rationality and social influence: Alpha-rational Nash equilibrium in games with herding","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Khushboo Agarwal, Konstantin Avrachenkov, Raghupati Vyas, Veeraruna Kavitha","submitted_at":"2024-06-06T10:09:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"The classical game theory models rational players and proposes Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution. However, real-world scenarios rarely feature rational players; instead, players make inconsistent and irrational decisions. Often, irrational players exhibit herding behaviour by simply following the majority.\n  In this paper, we consider the mean-field game with $\\alpha$-fraction of rational players and the rest being herding-irrational players. For such a game, we introduce a novel concept of equilibrium named $\\alpha$-Rational NE (in short, $\\alpha$-RNE). The $\\alpha$-RNEs and their implica"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2406.03928","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2024-06-06T10:09:37Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"1b5605c214bbe12af2ee0f14be99d9b971d9cd1e135fab4bdccf67c66f8f5799","abstract_canon_sha256":"98fd004794e4b8a7b6d67ed35494cbca04760235f71620e3439ffa7125b504a4"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002560Z","signature_b64":"IPA18o8IoIlrn4wodIT4cjMAFaCAj9+M+UXGEcUz0fDNeVuu23zEst54/D1rkiH9uQzqH6zbMucj+QQ+Z9uyAQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"a21ee1e88d69e26ecf217e9bda60166c036c5663914131fdd9bdd492aa5855a2","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002126Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002126Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Balancing rationality and social influence: Alpha-rational Nash equilibrium in games with herding","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Khushboo Agarwal, Konstantin Avrachenkov, Raghupati Vyas, Veeraruna Kavitha","submitted_at":"2024-06-06T10:09:37Z","abstract_excerpt":"The classical game theory models rational players and proposes Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution. However, real-world scenarios rarely feature rational players; instead, players make inconsistent and irrational decisions. Often, irrational players exhibit herding behaviour by simply following the majority.\n  In this paper, we consider the mean-field game with $\\alpha$-fraction of rational players and the rest being herding-irrational players. For such a game, we introduce a novel concept of equilibrium named $\\alpha$-Rational NE (in short, $\\alpha$-RNE). The $\\alpha$-RNEs and their implica"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2406.03928","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2406.03928/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2406.03928","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2406.03928v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2406.03928","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"UIPOD2ENNHRG","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZB","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"UIPOD2EN","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":1,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2506.17239","citing_title":"Price equilibria with positive margins in loyal-strategic markets with discrete prices","ref_index":8,"is_internal_anchor":true}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ","json":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/UIPOD2EN"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/UIPOD2EN","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2406.03928&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/UIPOD2ENNHRG5TZBP2N5UYAWNQ/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T08:28:18.002195+00:00"}