{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2015:W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV","short_pith_number":"pith:W3RY33IZ","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"b6e38ded191ac577acdbee84790a16955fb593b24a1455d9a37a9fe47f9374f6","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1511.06775","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Randomness and Arbitrary Coordination in the Reactive Ultimatum Game","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","authors_text":"Luis C. Lamb, Pablo A. Valverde, Roberto da Silva","submitted_at":"2015-11-20T21:18:31Z","abstract_excerpt":"Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in a evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for example, reactive aspects. In the ultimatum game the reciprocity and the fifty-fifty partition seems to be a deviation from rational behavior of the players under the light of the Nash equilibrium concept.Such equilibrium emerges, for example, from the punishment of the responder who generally tends to refuse unfair proposals. In the iterated version of the game"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1511.06775","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","submitted_at":"2015-11-20T21:18:31Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"9ef456965981e6ce0fee99aafc6a32c594be9b78e6b0f352aaea88ab2a9c5fdb","abstract_canon_sha256":"1c700bf7474e213b5d200a7e95af253de3ac10d7248a96fea68a5f4476b014fc"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058664Z","signature_b64":"bGKrVThqbeZrnUS20xx8NLfoTz4PQxZEGqsec5h8ZmMGDIJcmeIoKI+2o4sUtiafvu5YncDl1qvrdmvZ00e4BQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"b6e38ded191ac577acdbee84790a16955fb593b24a1455d9a37a9fe47f9374f6","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058237Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058237Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Randomness and Arbitrary Coordination in the Reactive Ultimatum Game","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"physics.soc-ph","authors_text":"Luis C. Lamb, Pablo A. Valverde, Roberto da Silva","submitted_at":"2015-11-20T21:18:31Z","abstract_excerpt":"Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in a evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for example, reactive aspects. In the ultimatum game the reciprocity and the fifty-fifty partition seems to be a deviation from rational behavior of the players under the light of the Nash equilibrium concept.Such equilibrium emerges, for example, from the punishment of the responder who generally tends to refuse unfair proposals. In the iterated version of the game"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1511.06775","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1511.06775","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058298+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1511.06775v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058298+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1511.06775","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058298+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"W3RY33IZDLCX","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:47.479230+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"W3RY33IZDLCXPLG3","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:47.479230+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"W3RY33IZ","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:29:47.479230+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV","json":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/W3RY33IZ"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/W3RY33IZ","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1511.06775&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/W3RY33IZDLCXPLG352CHSCQWSV/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058298+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T01:20:33.058298+00:00"}