{"bundle_type":"pith_open_graph_bundle","bundle_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2014:W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J","short_pith_number":"pith:W7APMEMX","canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1402.2801","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-02-12T12:30:36Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.DS"],"title_canon_sha256":"1ac45a61b821141e8dd1660b795b7d89a77832e4b616f5a3b1f05992943d3481","abstract_canon_sha256":"4304e058a2c6dd46d1a0c0725881423dbed4da9e2cbafc5da3d836ea5d9eddf2"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"b7c0f61197e43d3e5b776296438d07e2631e1725efc958ef4ffd542b463e0511","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1402.2801","version":2},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1402.2801","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1402.2801v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1402.2801","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"W7APMEMX4Q6T","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3X","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"W7APMEMX","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:54Z"}],"events":[{"event_type":"record_created","subject_pith_number":"pith:2014:W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J","target":"record","payload":{"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1402.2801","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-02-12T12:30:36Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.DS"],"title_canon_sha256":"1ac45a61b821141e8dd1660b795b7d89a77832e4b616f5a3b1f05992943d3481","abstract_canon_sha256":"4304e058a2c6dd46d1a0c0725881423dbed4da9e2cbafc5da3d836ea5d9eddf2"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"canonical_sha256":"b7c0f61197e43d3e5b776296438d07e2631e1725efc958ef4ffd542b463e0511","receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54.051648Z","signature_b64":"r9bUBh3aQF8y1JqRC2f82AYkyBPTxkok8N41zu4CLC13un4/0jhd8pOB1ajXOa/aBlF0K+mdPuDRP6U7P9BmCQ==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"b7c0f61197e43d3e5b776296438d07e2631e1725efc958ef4ffd542b463e0511","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54.051156Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54.051156Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"source_kind":"arxiv","source_id":"1402.2801","source_version":2,"attestation_state":"computed"},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"t4DiFgEV54r66yUJBvWGl3F6yvE08haTLYWMPXoQ2g5f7qQGPTG3suG+/Y/UkscXKCY7PKXPbF8S7p+QmcNJDQ==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-30T15:26:50.236813Z"},"content_sha256":"daaaa61371e68b7da925afbad4be0045a188f781e542d50d445f94a827a701ca","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:daaaa61371e68b7da925afbad4be0045a188f781e542d50d445f94a827a701ca"},{"event_type":"graph_snapshot","subject_pith_number":"pith:2014:W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J","target":"graph","payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.DS"],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman, Mallesh M. Pai","submitted_at":"2014-02-12T12:30:36Z","abstract_excerpt":"We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\\epsilon, \\gamma)$-differential privacy, that the folk theorem has little bite: for values of $\\epsilon$ and $\\gamma$ sufficiently small, for a fixed discount factor, any equilibrium of the repeated game involve players playing approximate equilibria of the stage game in every period. Next, we argue that in large games ($n$ player games in which unilateral deviations by single players have only a small"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1402.2801","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"verdict_id":null},"signer":{"signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z","supersedes":[],"prev_event":null,"signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"Qhz8Hzz5Qy3UQdgrtwAMAFdHpcQQ1ByNJtFF9Nm0sOqzYiV46/7deVyR8PFwBltPLVetFZ1Hjkcuk4HwgNAEDg==","signed_message":"open_graph_event_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-30T15:26:50.237597Z"},"content_sha256":"4c1699503c129809acda73bce6a7813fec9c94ddae07df9fbac9225b8cbff127","schema_version":"1.0","event_id":"sha256:4c1699503c129809acda73bce6a7813fec9c94ddae07df9fbac9225b8cbff127"}],"timestamp_proofs":[],"mirror_hints":[{"mirror_type":"https","name":"Pith Resolver","base_url":"https://pith.science","bundle_url":"https://pith.science/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J/bundle.json","state_url":"https://pith.science/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J/state.json","well_known_bundle_url":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J/bundle.json","status":"primary"}],"public_keys":[{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","format":"raw","public_key_b64":"stVStoiQhXFxp4s2pdzPNoqVNBMojDU/fJ2db5S3CbM=","public_key_hex":"b2d552b68890857171a78b36a5dccf368a953413288c353f7c9d9d6f94b709b3","fingerprint_sha256_b32_first128bits":"RVFV5Z2OI2J3ZUO7ERDEBCYNKS","fingerprint_sha256_hex":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","rotates_at":null,"url":"https://pith.science/pith-signing-key.json","notes":"Pith uses this Ed25519 key to sign canonical record SHA-256 digests. Verify with: ed25519_verify(public_key, message=canonical_sha256_bytes, signature=base64decode(signature_b64))."}],"merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","built_at":"2026-05-30T15:26:50Z","links":{"resolver":"https://pith.science/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J","bundle":"https://pith.science/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J/bundle.json","state":"https://pith.science/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J/state.json","well_known_bundle":"https://pith.science/.well-known/pith/W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J/bundle.json"},"state":{"state_type":"pith_open_graph_state","state_version":"1.0","pith_number":"pith:2014:W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3XMKLEHDIH4J","merge_version":"pith-open-graph-merge-v1","event_count":2,"valid_event_count":2,"invalid_event_count":0,"equivocation_count":0,"current":{"canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"4304e058a2c6dd46d1a0c0725881423dbed4da9e2cbafc5da3d836ea5d9eddf2","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.DS"],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-02-12T12:30:36Z","title_canon_sha256":"1ac45a61b821141e8dd1660b795b7d89a77832e4b616f5a3b1f05992943d3481"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1402.2801","kind":"arxiv","version":2}},"source_aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1402.2801","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1402.2801v2","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1402.2801","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"W7APMEMX4Q6T","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"W7APMEMX4Q6T4W3X","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:54Z"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"W7APMEMX","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:28:54Z"}],"graph_snapshots":[{"event_id":"sha256:4c1699503c129809acda73bce6a7813fec9c94ddae07df9fbac9225b8cbff127","target":"graph","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"graph_snapshot":{"author_claims":{"count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","strong_count":0},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"paper":{"abstract_excerpt":"We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\\epsilon, \\gamma)$-differential privacy, that the folk theorem has little bite: for values of $\\epsilon$ and $\\gamma$ sufficiently small, for a fixed discount factor, any equilibrium of the repeated game involve players playing approximate equilibria of the stage game in every period. Next, we argue that in large games ($n$ player games in which unilateral deviations by single players have only a small","authors_text":"Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman, Mallesh M. Pai","cross_cats":["cs.DS"],"headline":"","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-02-12T12:30:36Z","title":"An Anti-Folk Theorem for Large Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring"},"references":{"count":0,"internal_anchors":0,"resolved_work":0,"sample":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1402.2801","kind":"arxiv","version":2},"verdict":{"created_at":null,"id":null,"model_set":{},"one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"pith_extraction_headline":"","strongest_claim":"","weakest_assumption":""}},"verdict_id":null}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:daaaa61371e68b7da925afbad4be0045a188f781e542d50d445f94a827a701ca","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"4304e058a2c6dd46d1a0c0725881423dbed4da9e2cbafc5da3d836ea5d9eddf2","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.DS"],"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2014-02-12T12:30:36Z","title_canon_sha256":"1ac45a61b821141e8dd1660b795b7d89a77832e4b616f5a3b1f05992943d3481"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"1402.2801","kind":"arxiv","version":2}},"canonical_sha256":"b7c0f61197e43d3e5b776296438d07e2631e1725efc958ef4ffd542b463e0511","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"b7c0f61197e43d3e5b776296438d07e2631e1725efc958ef4ffd542b463e0511","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54.051156Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54.051156Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"r9bUBh3aQF8y1JqRC2f82AYkyBPTxkok8N41zu4CLC13un4/0jhd8pOB1ajXOa/aBlF0K+mdPuDRP6U7P9BmCQ==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-18T02:40:54.051648Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"1402.2801","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":2}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:daaaa61371e68b7da925afbad4be0045a188f781e542d50d445f94a827a701ca","sha256:4c1699503c129809acda73bce6a7813fec9c94ddae07df9fbac9225b8cbff127"],"state_sha256":"9654e191f41011a412d38ce4ba5902ae5d36bb840cb2bdcd61cde1979b41709b"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"UAy4o+L8HDj+0FkKSM1Gf2H7NzZb2I5vuOhll8k2u21X9jUZJN4QajW33s0c4HWQGxA7h77XY78TSrH/JJVKAA==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-30T15:26:50.241094Z","bundle_sha256":"2c4a9317b513d129090647a3cb0ec0b1f187e5aa274691d0f59dfb99b4d7f995"}}