{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2024:WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL","short_pith_number":"pith:WXZCHCUN","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"b5f2238a8dd208e0c09624dbf1302a52d98680df4da875fcde8ccadfa1f2fe95","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2403.03367","version":4},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","math.OC","q-fin.MF"],"primary_cat":"q-fin.TR","authors_text":"Austin Adams, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Dan Robinson, Sara Reynolds","submitted_at":"2024-03-05T23:28:50Z","abstract_excerpt":"Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The ``auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as ``pool manager'' for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2403.03367","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"q-fin.TR","submitted_at":"2024-03-05T23:28:50Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.GT","math.OC","q-fin.MF"],"title_canon_sha256":"17bcb35a36cf9e88b15ab7366b249c73607d33fcd6be7a5766366297e5d78875","abstract_canon_sha256":"3d0f570701a3151b9769df2244e8eee510156637d9818552d4faf6d3718ec568"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844820Z","signature_b64":"aU+b0GR4JeiZB5Il0zgDRgd6UuDbR9lr6lnNTzjf5dhy7HQRp0pgae5Mapnl7CeEzaMRsPiheDa+9DRzAvSzAw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"b5f2238a8dd208e0c09624dbf1302a52d98680df4da875fcde8ccadfa1f2fe95","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844320Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844320Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.GT","math.OC","q-fin.MF"],"primary_cat":"q-fin.TR","authors_text":"Austin Adams, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Dan Robinson, Sara Reynolds","submitted_at":"2024-03-05T23:28:50Z","abstract_excerpt":"Automated market makers (AMMs) have emerged as the dominant market mechanism for trading on decentralized exchanges implemented on blockchains. This paper presents a single mechanism that targets two important unsolved problems for AMMs: reducing losses to informed orderflow, and maximizing revenue from uninformed orderflow. The ``auction-managed AMM'' works by running a censorship-resistant onchain auction for the right to temporarily act as ``pool manager'' for a constant-product AMM. The pool manager sets the swap fee rate on the pool, and also receives the accrued fees from swaps. The pool"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2403.03367","kind":"arxiv","version":4},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2403.03367/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2403.03367","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2403.03367v4","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2403.03367","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"WXZCHCUN2IEO","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEW","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"WXZCHCUN","created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":2,"internal_anchor_count":1,"sample":[{"citing_arxiv_id":"2607.08525","citing_title":"Causal Effects of Protocol-Fee Changes on Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers","ref_index":6,"is_internal_anchor":true},{"citing_arxiv_id":"2606.21769","citing_title":"Optimal Dynamic Fees for Automated Market Makers: A Stochastic Control Approach to Loss-Versus-Rebalancing","ref_index":1,"is_internal_anchor":false}]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL","json":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/WXZCHCUN"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/WXZCHCUN","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2403.03367&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/WXZCHCUN2IEOBQEWETN7CMBKKL/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T10:12:58.844377+00:00"}