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In a numerical study calibrated to historical clinical-trial data, our framework reduces expected sample-sizes by over 48% relative to classical designs that attain the same social-welfare.","weakest_assumption":"The framework requires no knowledge of experimenters' private preferences or costs and mitigates strategic Bayesian persuasion, with the regulator only setting a minimum expected welfare threshold that experimenters optimize subject to."}},"verdict_id":"e3dec92a-4280-4232-b6af-cc83ba9166c2"}}],"author_attestations":[],"timestamp_anchors":[],"storage_attestations":[],"citation_signatures":[],"replication_records":[],"corrections":[],"mirror_hints":[],"record_created":{"event_id":"sha256:0b19211a2f51d15479300378307d25c98e6ff10e9f7ed60c9286d998651c48bd","target":"record","created_at":"2026-05-20T00:02:37Z","signer":{"key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signer_id":"pith.science","signer_type":"pith_registry"},"payload":{"attestation_state":"computed","canonical_record":{"metadata":{"abstract_canon_sha256":"7cd83abc38c7289cd6b5344b2a457bec5e55d808ce6a066ccbee5e458fdb2925","cross_cats_sorted":[],"license":"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/","primary_cat":"econ.EM","submitted_at":"2026-05-15T23:33:14Z","title_canon_sha256":"419c55eb4a3c1b0e2f370bdfb05d5b33a5132aeed93ebd740cdaea45b635d07c"},"schema_version":"1.0","source":{"id":"2605.16703","kind":"arxiv","version":1}},"canonical_sha256":"c14292e2809086e74ca5587f68206ce693d2e8df4a456d9cd1ee854583fff8c5","receipt":{"algorithm":"ed25519","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","canonical_sha256":"c14292e2809086e74ca5587f68206ce693d2e8df4a456d9cd1ee854583fff8c5","first_computed_at":"2026-05-20T00:02:37.339950Z","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","kind":"pith_receipt","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-20T00:02:37.339950Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","receipt_version":"0.3","signature_b64":"jhU3xjGk8x+TQuKszzK0DoT+vp4nNzVdBjvvAPFhKihugJ2pJxiq2H6hBT3rhOSGY9Y4pPO6eDAGdGp2aSmKBg==","signature_status":"signed_v1","signed_at":"2026-05-20T00:02:37.340732Z","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes"},"source_id":"2605.16703","source_kind":"arxiv","source_version":1}}},"equivocations":[],"invalid_events":[],"applied_event_ids":["sha256:0b19211a2f51d15479300378307d25c98e6ff10e9f7ed60c9286d998651c48bd","sha256:d08b024d168efc9b4e02c400cd291bf4b0f7a3838490b2879997868d757d4e5e"],"state_sha256":"fe3fa89546765c98a2223e123a929b160822608f42a05317ccfcd81fcb89f0e9"},"bundle_signature":{"signature_status":"signed_v1","algorithm":"ed25519","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54","signature_b64":"PjFW7MO2szGyFiYpDr6PmUdMfWYCrGhZSPndP0BlHeAUxY37vIyWbt3WNRYVdB+IYMU+ajZUy88GmjltnKx2Bg==","signed_message":"bundle_sha256_bytes","signed_at":"2026-05-25T15:03:26.043416Z","bundle_sha256":"3b48857323870a97761a5f20a61df666a06d5ce0fb8032f20199a75b1bb107c0"}}