{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2024:YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG","short_pith_number":"pith:YTLWFRR5","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"c4d762c63d55997c36b5376fe97416399d86a88b775c11befb105d6d61423670","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"2407.00419","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"On the Complexity of Learning to Cooperate with Populations of Socially Rational Agents","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.AI","cs.GT","cs.MA"],"primary_cat":"cs.LG","authors_text":"Mustafa Mert \\c{C}elikok, Robert Loftin, Saptarashmi Bandyopadhyay","submitted_at":"2024-06-29T11:59:52Z","abstract_excerpt":"Artificially intelligent agents deployed in the real-world will require the ability to reliably \\textit{cooperate} with humans (as well as other, heterogeneous AI agents). To provide formal guarantees of successful cooperation, we must make some assumptions about how partner agents could plausibly behave. Any realistic set of assumptions must account for the fact that other agents may be just as adaptable as our agent is. In this work, we consider the problem of cooperating with a \\textit{population} of agents in a finitely-repeated, two player general-sum matrix game with private utilities. T"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"2407.00419","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.LG","submitted_at":"2024-06-29T11:59:52Z","cross_cats_sorted":["cs.AI","cs.GT","cs.MA"],"title_canon_sha256":"b8f4b6fca50396eac17caaefad2e257f958499391f5fb2106b59e23bef8324d4","abstract_canon_sha256":"4c8441e11eafb93f9025da5cb3043bc27502418d62c05696d8a60f2282b36cfb"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.234113Z","signature_b64":"GqDCKnh3oAELpPMXM97V3acqDaIOo1Rc7m4AvuauBtC2gkbHt2Qem7dtZYrrTKFJDxLaYCoaGu+JwcS3OBpSBA==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"c4d762c63d55997c36b5376fe97416399d86a88b775c11befb105d6d61423670","last_reissued_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233720Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233720Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"On the Complexity of Learning to Cooperate with Populations of Socially Rational Agents","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":["cs.AI","cs.GT","cs.MA"],"primary_cat":"cs.LG","authors_text":"Mustafa Mert \\c{C}elikok, Robert Loftin, Saptarashmi Bandyopadhyay","submitted_at":"2024-06-29T11:59:52Z","abstract_excerpt":"Artificially intelligent agents deployed in the real-world will require the ability to reliably \\textit{cooperate} with humans (as well as other, heterogeneous AI agents). To provide formal guarantees of successful cooperation, we must make some assumptions about how partner agents could plausibly behave. Any realistic set of assumptions must account for the fact that other agents may be just as adaptable as our agent is. In this work, we consider the problem of cooperating with a \\textit{population} of agents in a finitely-repeated, two player general-sum matrix game with private utilities. T"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"2407.00419","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"integrity":{"clean":true,"summary":{"advisory":0,"critical":0,"by_detector":{},"informational":0},"endpoint":"/pith/2407.00419/integrity.json","findings":[],"available":true,"detectors_run":[],"snapshot_sha256":"c28c3603d3b5d939e8dc4c7e95fa8dfce3d595e45f758748cecf8e644a296938"},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"2407.00419","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"2407.00419v1","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.2407.00419","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"YTLWFRR5KWMX","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVV","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"YTLWFRR5","created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG","json":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/YTLWFRR5"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/YTLWFRR5","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=2407.00419&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/YTLWFRR5KWMXYNVVG5X6S5AWHG/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00","updated_at":"2026-07-05T08:38:40.233778+00:00"}