{"record_type":"pith_number_record","schema_url":"https://pith.science/schemas/pith-number/v1.json","pith_number":"pith:2016:ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O","short_pith_number":"pith:ZLF4ZPCX","schema_version":"1.0","canonical_sha256":"cacbccbc578b217bceb6a416cfbdf0fba853aa61e760b556a41d29933111a492","source":{"kind":"arxiv","id":"1606.01457","version":1},"attestation_state":"computed","paper":{"title":"Approximately Envy-Free Spectrum Allocation with Complementarities","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dengwang Tang, Vijay Subramanian","submitted_at":"2016-06-05T03:27:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we can assess prices, we present a mechanism that is efficient, approximately envy-free, asymptotically strategy-proof and that has polynomial-time complexity. Modifying an iterative rounding procedure from assignment problems, we use the primal and dual optimal solutions to the linear programming relaxation of the auction problem to construct a lottery for the a"},"verification_status":{"content_addressed":true,"pith_receipt":true,"author_attested":false,"weak_author_claims":0,"strong_author_claims":0,"externally_anchored":false,"storage_verified":false,"citation_signatures":0,"replication_records":0,"graph_snapshot":true,"references_resolved":false,"formal_links_present":false},"canonical_record":{"source":{"id":"1606.01457","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"metadata":{"license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","primary_cat":"cs.GT","submitted_at":"2016-06-05T03:27:29Z","cross_cats_sorted":[],"title_canon_sha256":"1d0f4bf05177bcee95e26e23bfe68bd4e201446969b8f9e4d5d73e7072859a68","abstract_canon_sha256":"1efa60eaf792a8e0edd491647e583a93bcadb79373346c5ffffea2b7b9dc9c1a"},"schema_version":"1.0"},"receipt":{"kind":"pith_receipt","key_id":"pith-v1-2026-05","algorithm":"ed25519","signed_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.112065Z","signature_b64":"QjHorDUBwqf0t1Eo7hBzudzDKodhqws8Wb0GGeMces5C0Wmx2gywJu8CexwyHEW7YAm3w5C4y2oeR5gRjwsIAw==","signed_message":"canonical_sha256_bytes","builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1","receipt_version":"0.3","canonical_sha256":"cacbccbc578b217bceb6a416cfbdf0fba853aa61e760b556a41d29933111a492","last_reissued_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111704Z","signature_status":"signed_v1","first_computed_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111704Z","public_key_fingerprint":"8d4b5ee74e4693bcd1df2446408b0d54"},"graph_snapshot":{"paper":{"title":"Approximately Envy-Free Spectrum Allocation with Complementarities","license":"http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/","headline":"","cross_cats":[],"primary_cat":"cs.GT","authors_text":"Dengwang Tang, Vijay Subramanian","submitted_at":"2016-06-05T03:27:29Z","abstract_excerpt":"With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we can assess prices, we present a mechanism that is efficient, approximately envy-free, asymptotically strategy-proof and that has polynomial-time complexity. Modifying an iterative rounding procedure from assignment problems, we use the primal and dual optimal solutions to the linear programming relaxation of the auction problem to construct a lottery for the a"},"claims":{"count":0,"items":[],"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"source":{"id":"1606.01457","kind":"arxiv","version":1},"verdict":{"id":null,"model_set":{},"created_at":null,"strongest_claim":"","one_line_summary":"","pipeline_version":null,"weakest_assumption":"","pith_extraction_headline":""},"references":{"count":0,"sample":[],"resolved_work":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57","internal_anchors":0},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"author_claims":{"count":0,"strong_count":0,"snapshot_sha256":"258153158e38e3291e3d48162225fcdb2d5a3ed65a07baac614ab91432fd4f57"},"builder_version":"pith-number-builder-2026-05-17-v1"},"aliases":[{"alias_kind":"arxiv","alias_value":"1606.01457","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111762+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"arxiv_version","alias_value":"1606.01457v1","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111762+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"doi","alias_value":"10.48550/arxiv.1606.01457","created_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111762+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_12","alias_value":"ZLF4ZPCXRMQX","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:30:53.716459+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_16","alias_value":"ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVW","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:30:53.716459+00:00"},{"alias_kind":"pith_short_8","alias_value":"ZLF4ZPCX","created_at":"2026-05-18T12:30:53.716459+00:00"}],"events":[],"event_summary":{},"paper_claims":[],"inbound_citations":{"count":0,"internal_anchor_count":0,"sample":[]},"formal_canon":{"evidence_count":0,"sample":[],"anchors":[]},"links":{"html":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O","json":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O.json","graph_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/graph.json","events_json":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/events.json","paper":"https://pith.science/paper/ZLF4ZPCX"},"agent_actions":{"view_html":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O","download_json":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O.json","view_paper":"https://pith.science/paper/ZLF4ZPCX","resolve_alias":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/resolve?arxiv=1606.01457&json=true","fetch_graph":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/graph.json","fetch_events":"https://pith.science/api/pith-number/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/events.json","actions":{"anchor_timestamp":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/action/timestamp_anchor","attest_storage":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/action/storage_attestation","attest_author":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/action/author_attestation","sign_citation":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/action/citation_signature","submit_replication":"https://pith.science/pith/ZLF4ZPCXRMQXXTVWUQLM7PPQ7O/action/replication_record"}},"created_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111762+00:00","updated_at":"2026-05-18T01:12:54.111762+00:00"}